Jackson v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

47 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 47 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[T]he standard to be applied to plea negotiations is one of fair play and equity under the facts and circumstances of the case, which, although entailing certain contract concepts, is to be distinguished from ... the strict application of the common law principles of contracts. The rigid application of contract law to plea negotiations would be incongruous since, for example, the trial court is not ordinarily bound by the compact and, as the State concedes, it cannot obtain “specific performance” of a defendant’s promise to plead guilty.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Tweedy v. State · 186 Md. App. 354 - Rios v. State

2. ““(1) conclusively determines the disputed question, (2) resolves an important issue, (3) resolves an issue that is, completely separate from the merits of the action, and (4) would be effectively unreviewable if the appeal had to await the entry of a final judgment.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 199 Md. App. 678 - Buzbee v. State · Stephens v. State

3. “Absolute immunity ... is a time-bound right that fits precisely the framework of the collateral order doctrine: it is an important issue separate and apart from the merits of the case that is effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment because taking the case to a final judgment will destroy the right____ When the immunity claimed is a qualified immunity, not an absolute immunity, however, application of the collateral order doctrine is not as clear-cut, for two reasons. First, it may not be possible to determine whether the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity without resolving disputes of fact that go to the merits of the case. In that circumstance, the issue of qualified immunity is not “collateral,” within the meaning of the collateral order doctrine: “When ... resolution of the immunity defense depends upon disputed factual issues, or upon mixed questions of fact and law, an immediate appeal will not lie, and review of the qualified immunity determination will have to await the trial court’s resolution of the factual questions.” ... Only when a qualified immunity defense can be decided without delving into and resolving disputed facts is an interlocutory order denying summary judgment sufficiently separate from the merits of the case to qualify as a collateral order.... Second, even if the issue is truly collateral, the defense of qualified immunity may not be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment because it may not be tantamount to”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 140 Md. App. 282 - Baltimore Police Department v. Cherkes