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← 358 Pa. Super. 7 - Bold v. Bold

358 Pa. Super. 7 - Bold v. Bold’s Empirical Analysis

1986

Citation profile

25
cited by 25 later decisions
1
states following
January 2014
most recently cited

25 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 25 later decisions — most recently January 2014 · most notably 426 Pa. Super. 245 - Perlberger v. Perlberger (1993), 365 Pa. Super. 409 - Johnson v. Johnson (1988)

25 state decisions

1301986199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on 339 Pa. Super. 185 - Braderman v. Braderman · 331 Pa. Super. 1 - Semasek v. Semasek · 351 Pa. Super. 588 - Sergi v. Sergi · 343 Pa. Super. 234 - Barnhart v. Barnhart · Estep v. Estep

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 25 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “This case represents the classic quandary that confronts our trial courts regarding the issue of potential tax liability as it effects the equitable distribution of property. If a taxable event such as a sale or other transfer of property is required by the award of equitable distribution, or is certain to occur shortly thereafter, the tax liability of the parties can be reasonably ascertainable. However, where there is merely a likelihood or possibility that a taxable event will occur, the court is left to speculate as to the tax consequences. In order to insure a “fair and just determination and settlement of property rights” we favor predictability over mere surmise in the valuation and distribution of marital property after divorce. Accordingly, we hold that potential tax liability may be considered in valuing marital assets only where a taxable event has occurred as a result of the divorce or equitable distribution of property or is certain to occur within a time frame such that the tax liability can be reasonably predicted.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “‘Under this standard, we do not usurp the hearing court’s duty as factfinder. Rather, we apply the legislative guidelines of the Divorce Code to the record to determine whether or not the hearing court has abused its discretion.’ Barnhart v. Barnhart, 343 Pa.Super. 234, 237 , 494 A.2d 443, 444 (1985); Semasek v. Semasek, 331 Pa.Super. 1, 6 , 479 A.2d 1047, 1050 (1984). ‘An abuse of discretion is not found lightly, but only upon a showing of clear and convincing evidence____ However, an abuse of discretion will be found by this Court if the trial court failed to follow proper legal procedure or misapplied the law.’ Braderman v. Braderman, 339 Pa.Super. 185, 190 , 488 A.2d 613, 615 (1985).”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “[Wife’s] calculations go beyond the basic figures presented by husband, and provide the court with a workable present value of the pension. Husband was permitted to cross-examine the expert, and has not, at the hearings, through exceptions, or on appeal, shown specifically where these calculations are erroneous. Thus, the trial court did not err in accepting the master’s recommendation based on the essentially uncontradicted testimony of the expert witness.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.