State v. Robertson’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

27 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 27 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “To admit demonstrative evidence at trial the law requires that the object be identified. The identification can be visual, that is, by testimony at the trial that the object exhibited is the one related to the case. It can also be identified by chain of custody, that is, by establishing the custody of the object from the time it was seized to the time it was offered in evidence. State v. Robertson, 358 So.2d 931 (La.1978); State v. King, 355 So.2d 1305 (La.1978); State v. Dotson [ 260 La. 471 ], 256 So.2d 594 (1971). For the admission of demonstrative evidence, it suffices if the foundation laid establishes that it is more probable than not that the object is the one connected with the case. State v. Robinson, supra; State v. King, supra ; State v. Williams, 341 So.2d 370 (La.1976) State v. Collins, 328 So.2d 674 (La.1976). Lack of positive identification goes to the weight of the evidence rather than to its admissibility. Ultimately connexity is a factual matter for determination by the jury. State v. Robinson, supra. State v. King, supra . State v. Hayes, 306 So.2[d] 705 (La.1975); State v. Freeman, 306 So.2d 703 (La.1975); State v. Dotson, supra ; State v. Wright [ 254 La. 521 ], 225 So.2d 201 (1969)”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 419 So. 2d 963 - State v. Moore

2. “Identification of Robertson as one of the perpetrators of the robbery was a material issue in dispute; therefore, the fingerprint identification of Robertson was highly probative to place him at Pailet and Penedo jewelers. Since the fingerprint on the card obtained from the latent print files in Washington was not current and not clearly identified as being that of Robertson, the in-court fingerprint procedure was necessary to obtain a current fingerprint which undeniably was Robertson’s. Clearly, the probative value of the procedure outweighed any prejudicial effects. Hence, we find no merit to defendants’ contention that the trial judge erred in requiring Robertson to be fingerprinted in the presence of the jury.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Guiden

3. “"The statement's primary function is to set forth in general terms the nature of the charge and of the evidence sufficiently to enable the jury to follow the proceedings and to inform the accused of what acts on his part the state intends to prove. La.Code Crim.P. arts. 766, 769; State v. Robertson, No. 60,909, 358 So.2d 931 (La., April 10, 1978); State v. Sneed, 316 So.2d 372 (La.1975)." State v. Drew, 360 So.2d 500, 519-520 (La.1978).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 410 So. 2d 689 - State v. Chapman