Shipley, Inc. v. Long’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

13 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 17 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “The second question the federal court certified to us requires us to interpret the word “display,” as set out in § 5-68-502, which, as noted above, provides in relevant part that it shall be unlawful to “display material which is harmful to minors in such a way that minors, as a part of the invited general public, will be exposed to view such material.” The federal court asks whether books and magazines with “harmful” contents, but with no “harmful” material on their covers, are “displayed” under the statute if they are simply shelved in bookcases or on bookshelves without any additional action or effort on the part of the bookseller to single them out or draw attention to them. In Ginsberg v. State of New York, 390 U.S. 629 , 88 S.Ct. 1274 , 20 L.Ed.2d 195 (1968), the Supreme Court held that a state may prohibit the distribution of sexually explicit materials to children, even though the materials would not e considered obscene if they were distributed to an adult. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 636-37 , 88 S.Ct. 1274 . Such prohibitions are permissible, so long as they do not unreasonably restrict adults’ access to material which is not obscene as to them. See Upper Midwest Booksellers v. City of Minneapolis, 780 F.2d 1389 (8th Cir.1985). The Arkansas statute employing the word “display” does not define the term. However, other sources define thé word to mean “to present or hold up to view.” See The American Heritage Collage Dictionary at 400 (3d ed.1997). The booksellers argue that”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 454 F. Supp. 2d 819 - SHIPLEY, INC. v. Long

2. “The Virginia high court concluded that the focus of the inquiry should not be upon the youngest members of the class, not upon the most sensitive members of the class, and not upon the majority of the class. The court concluded, “if a work is found to have a serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value for a legitimate minority of normal, older adolescents, then it cannot be said to lack such value for the entire class of juveniles taken as a whole.” Id., 236 Va. at 177 , 372 S.E.2d at 623-24 . In the present case, the State urges us to adopt the same “narrowing” interpretation utilized by the Virginia court, reminding this court that it is our duty, if it is at all possible, to adopt an interpretation of an act that preserves its constitutionality. However, under the Virginia court’s so-called “variable obscenity” interpretation, works which are plainly inappropriate for younger children would not fall within the scope of the statute, because those works would have some serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for an older adolescent. For example, during oral argument, counsel for the booksellers pointed out that a book such as The Joy of Sex could be considered to have serious value for a married seventeen-year-Old, who might refer to the book for guidance. That book, counsel surmised, has serious value for the older minor, and therefore it would, not be considered “harmful,” within the meaning of the statute and would thus be available for al”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 454 F. Supp. 2d 819 - SHIPLEY, INC. v. Long

3. “Thus, to violate the ‘to allow-to-view 1 provisions a bookseller must be aware that certain circumstances exist—i.e., that a minor is viewing ‘harmful’ material. Simply shelving and displaying ‘harmful’ materials is likely not enough for a bookseller to- violate the ‘allow-to-view’ provisions, but neither is a bookseller required to grant affirmative permission for a minor to look at ‘harmful’ materials before he or she will be in violation of the statute. The language of the statute indicates that a bookseller must be aware that a minor is viewing ‘harmful’ material, and then deliberately turn a blind eye to that activity, before the bookseller will have allowed a minor to view ‘harmful’ material.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 454 F. Supp. 2d 819 - SHIPLEY, INC. v. Long