¶1dissenting.
¶2In the instant case, this Court must apply N.C.G.S. § 15A-1340.16(d), which states “[e]violence necessary to prove an element of the offense shall not be used to prove any factor in aggravation, and the same item of evidence shall not be used to prove more than one factor in aggravation.” N.C.G.S. § 1340.16(d) (2003) (emphasis added). The majority would insert language into this unambiguous provision to hold that “the plain meaning of the second clause is that the ‘same “distinct part” of evidence’ shall not be used to prove more than one aggravator.” Because I would leave amendment of N.C.G.S. § 15A-1340.16(d) to our legislative branch, I cannot join with the majority’s reading of this provision.
¶3“It is well settled that the meaning of any legislative enactment is controlled by the intent of the legislature and that legislative purpose is to be firstascertained from the plain language of the statute.” State v. Bates, 348 N.C. 29, 34, 497 S.E.2d 276, 279 (1998). Moreover, “[i]f the Legislature has used language of clear import, the court should not indulge in speculation or conjecture for its meaning. . . . Courts are not permitted to assume that the lawmaker has used words ignorantly or without meaning, unless compelled to do so to prevent a manifestly absurd result.” Nance v. S. Ry., 149 N.C. 267, 271, 149 N.C. 366, 371, 63 S.E. 116, 118 (1908).
¶4Here, the first clause of N.C.G.S. § 15A-1340.16(d) clearly prohibits double-counting of elements and aggravators. The second clause, which contains the phrase “same item of evidence,” however, prohibits the use of the same item of evidence to support more than one aggravating factor. This conclusion is necessitated by the plain *618language of the phrases employed by the drafters and the basic tenet of statutory construction that “the entire sentence, section or statute must be taken into consideration, and every word must be given its proper effect and weight.” Id. at 271, 149 N.C. at 371, 63 S.E. at 118.
¶5The majority makes much ado about the “absurd result” the same item of evidence rule might have; I however, see no absurdity in requiring the State to adequately establish the existence of an aggravating factor, particularly in light of this Court’s application of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 159 L. Ed. 2d 403 (2004), in State v. Allen, 359 N.C. 425, 615 S.E.2d 256 (July 1, 2005) (No. 485PA04). Thus, because I would give “proper effect and weight” to the General Assembly’s use of “item of evidence” as opposed to “evidence,” I respectfully dissent.