State v. Anderson’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 federal appellate · 17 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 19 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Consistent with the principles set out in Terry v. Ohio (citation omitted), the officer must have a specific and articula-ble suspicion of a violation before the stop will. be justified. [Marben v. State, Dep’t Public Safety ], 294 N.W.2d [697] at 699 [Minn.1980] (emphasis supplied). The standard, which we will define as the reasonable suspicion standard, was more precisely defined in People v. Ingle, 36 N.Y.2d 413 , 369 N.Y.S.2d 67 , 330 N.E.2d 39 (1975). Discussing the standard, the court said: It should be emphasized that the factual basis required to support a stop for a “routine traffic check” is minimal .... All that is required is that the stop be not the product of mere whim, caprice, or idle curiosity. It is enough if the stop is based upon “specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant [the] intrusion[.]” 36 N.Y.2d at 420 , 369 N.Y.S.2d at 74 , 330 N.E.2d at 44 (citation omitted).”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Lownes · State v. Thill

2. “[A] police officer may not stop a vehicle without a reasonable basis for doing so. Consistent with the principles set out in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), the officer must have a specific and articulable suspicion of a violation before the stop will be justified.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. In Re the Revocation of the Driver's License of Hopewell