¶1(concurring specially).
¶2I agree with the result reached by the majority opinion although I am of the further opinion that the decisive law is set forth in the partition statutes 12 O.S.1951 §§ 1501-1516, as amended in 1953.
¶3In this case there is evidence sufficient for the trial court to conclude that Hart’s lawyer caused Pharaoh’s lawyer to believe that Hart and Pharaoh had worked out their differences and that it would not be necessary for Pharaoh’s lawyer to remain active in the case. While it is obvious from the evidence and the trial court’s finding that there was no fraud committed by Hart’s lawyer it is apparent that there was a misunderstanding by the attorneys which was no doubt responsible for Pharaoh’s failure to elect to take the property within the ten day period allowed by 12 O.S.1951 § 1512, as amended in 1953.
¶4The evidence tends to show that the ap-praisement of $1,250 was too low. Pharaoh had paid $250 for a one-sixth interest in this property on the 10th day of June, 1958. This indicates that Pharaoh would value the property at $1,500. Hart paid $1,250 for the property on October 21, 1958, and sold it three days later to Blalock for $1,-325.91.
¶5Under the foregoing circumstances I am of the opinion that under the provisions of 12 O.S.1951 §§ 1510 and 1516, and our decision in Hargis v. Hargis, 181 Okl. 377, 73 P.2d 1129, it was within the sound judicial discretion of the trial court to set aside its order of October 21, 1958, to vacate the-deed, and to direct the appraisers to make- and return a new appraisement.
¶6For the reasons assigned by the majority and those expressed herein I concur.
¶7I am authorized to say that IRWIN, J.„. concurs in the views herein expressed.