IIi RECHAE CHAN PING.
431
Tn re
CHAE
CHAN
PING.
(lJireuit COWl't, No D. California. October 115, 1888.} The Chinese exclusion act, approved October 1; 1888, took effect from its passage. and it applies to all Chinese laborers who had departed from the United 8tates, and had notin fact returned and arrived in the United States before the passage of the act. 2. SAME-CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Ex POST FACTO LAW. The Chinese exclusion act of October 1, 1888, is a valid act. It is not unconstitutional as being a law divesting rights fully vested under the several treaties between the United States and China. and the prior restriction acts of 1882 and 1884, to which it is supplemental, or as being an ex postfac/o)aw 8. SAME-OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS-CERTIFICATES UNDER ACT OF 1882. Certificates issued under the restriction acts of 1882 and 1884 are Dot CODtracts between the United States and the Chinese laborers. to whom they are respectively issued. They are issued as evidence to identify parties entitled to privileges provided for in our treaties with China, and acts passed to give them effect. . 4. OF CONGRESS-REPEAL. With respect to matters proper for congressional legislation. treaties and acts of congress stand upon an equal footing as parts of the supreme law of the hind,and a later inconsistent provision in llither repeals the earlier in the other. (8yllabUll by tM (Jourt.)
Petition for Writ of Habea8 G'OrpUB. The petitioner is a Chinese laborer, a subject of the of China. He resided in the state of California, and followed the occu pation of laborer, at San Francisco, Cal., from 1875 until June 2,1887. On the last-named day he departed from San Francisco for China, ontha steam· ship Gaelio, having in his possession the certificate duly issued to him by the collector of customs of the port of San Francisco, in pursuance of the provisions of section 4 of the restriction act of 1882, as amended by the· act of 1884. He sailed from Hong Kong, China, on his to California, on the steam-ship Belgic, on September 7, 188B, and arrived at the port of Ban Francisco on October 7,1888. On October 1,1888, .he wason the high seas, en route for California; and until his arrival at the port of San Francisco, at the date aforesaid, he had no notice, or means of knowledge, of the passage by congress of the exclusion act, which became a law on October 1, 1888. On hill arrival at San Francisco, he presented to the customs officers his certificate so duly issued to him, as aforesaid, on his departure, under section 4 of the restriction act, as amended in 1884, and demanded permission to land. The collector refused to permit him to land, solely on the ground that, under the act of congress approved October 1, 1888, supplemental to the re.striction acts. of 1882 and 1884, the certificate was annulled and made · void,and his light to land abrogated, and that the petitioner was thereby forbidden to again .enter the United States. Upon these facts appearing in petition the writ of habeas C017JUB was issued. and the petitioner · produced in obedience to its c0IT;lmallds.
FEDERAL EEPORTER.
T. D. Riordan, Lyman I. Mowrey, and A. H. Ricketts, for petitioner. J. T. Carey, U. S. Atty., contra; . Before SAWYER, Circuit Judge, and HOFFMAN, District Judge. SAWYER, J., (after stating the facts as above.) The first queiltion arising on the facts stated, is, is the petitioner embraced within the provisions of the act of congress approved October 1, 1888, forbidding the coming of Chinese laborers iilto the United States? Upon this point, it seems to us, there can be no doubt. The language of section 1 of the act, so far as it affects the petitioner, is, "that, from and after the passage of this act, it shall be unlawful for any Chinese laborer, who shall at any time heretofore ha\7e been *. * * a resident within the United States, and who shall have departed * * * therefrom, and shall nothave returned before the passage of this act, * * * to return to * * * · the United States." And of sectiop 2, Hthat no certificate of identifica· tion provided for in 'the fourth ,and fifth sections of the acts to which this is supplemental shall hereafter be issued, and every certificate here· tofore issued in pursuance thereof is hereby declared void and of no eflect, and, the Chinese laborer, claiming admission by virtue thereof, shall not be permitted to enter. the United States." This language is clear and exact, and is susceptible of but one construction. The act, in express and unmistakable terms, fixes the date from which it shall begin to operate, and that date is "from and after the passage of this act; that is t() .say, October 1,1888, when it became a law. In equally clear and explidt terms it provides upon whom it shall operate, and that is "any Chinese laborer, who shall at any. time heretofore have been * * * a resident within the United States, and shall have departed, :" * * ahd shall not have returned before the passage of this act, "-not every · Chinese laborerwho shall have departed and not yet have started on his return, but evel'y Chinese laborer who shall have departed, and shall not ·in fact" have returned hefore the passage of this act!' There is nopossible. ground under this specific language of inferring an exception in favor of those who were on the high seas at the date of the passage of . the act. The act, by' express provision, operates upon all within its terms from 'the nioment it was approved by the president and became a 'law. Now, tJhepetitioner J?ad been a resident within the United States, arid he had departed therefrom with his certificate duly issued in pursuance of seCtion 4 of the prior restriction act, as amended, and he had ! not returned "before the passage of this act." He did not in fact return till several days after its passage. There cannot be any doubt that the act'operates upon him, anu, this being so, under section lit is unlawful fot him to return to the United States, and by section 2 his certificate is declared to be "void, an-dof no effect," and it is provided that he "shall not be permitted to enter the United States." To admit him, therefore, would beta directly violate the unmistakable provisions of the statute. , But it is said, it would he a great hardship, and a violation of the faith 'of the'nation to, now, shut' out those who were already on the way, relying upon the treaties and law as they were when they left China upon !
IN RE CHAE CHAN PH'iG.
.433
their return voyage without-any means of notice of the change until·their arrival. Be it so. That is no concern of the courts, acting judicially, except so far as it bears upon the construction of an ambiguous statute. The responsibility of this hardship is not upon the courts. They do not and cannot make the law. That was a consideraion to be addl'E'ssed to congress and the president. It is the duty of the courts to administer, and enforce the law as they find it. Hardship affords no justification, or authority, for the courts to take out of the provisions of the statute by forced construction, matters that congress clearly, and, unmistakably, intended should not be excepted. That congress intended no such exceptions is not only apparent from the clear llnd unambiguous language used, but from its own action during the course of the passage of the bill through congress, and by the subsequent action of both the executive and .congress. One of the grounds of a motion to reconsider in the senate before final action on the bill, was, that, there might be an opportunity to provide an exception of this very class of cas but that body s, refused to reconsider for that purpose. So the president, in his message accompanying his approval, noticed the comprehensive terms of the act, .and suggested the immediate passage of another act, or joint resolution making this very exception; but congress declined to act upon the auggestion. It is evident, therefore, both from the language of the act, and the action of the president and congress, that llosuch exception was intended. It would be a gross assumption of authority for the court to now ingraft the exception, so repudiated, upon the act. It is next urged with great zeal by petitioner's counsel that if the petitioner is within the scope of the act, then the act is unconstitutional, and void-First, as divesting a right indefeasibly vested under the treaties and laws passed in pursuance thereof; secondly, as being an ex post facto law within the clause of the constitution providing that congress shall have no power to pass ex post facto laws. The certificate, it is urged, is a contract entered into between the United States and the petitioner in pursuance of the restriction act, which vests him with a right that can. not now be divested under the general principles of public justice, even though the constitutional provision against passing Jaws impairing the obligation of is in terms only restrictive upon the states. We thmk this is not the correct view. There is no contract between the United States and individual Chinese laborers at all. The Chinese laborers obtain no rights under the acts of congress beyond whllt is secured to them by the treaties. There is no conSIderation moving Irom them, individually or collectively, under the act of congress, upon which a contract was founded. All the nghts"they have are derivative, merely, resting upon thestipula'tions of the treaty between the two governments, which are the contracting, and only contracting parties Instead of larging their rights, the acts of congress are restrictive in character, and the restrictions were adopted in pursuance of the agreement allowing such restriction in the last treaty. The certificates are mere instruments of evidence, issued to afford convenient proof of the identity of the party entitled to enjoy the priviIegessecured by the trtJaties, and.to v.36F.no.7-28
434
FEDERAL REPORTER.
prevent frauds, and they are designated in the last act. The act, in fact,restrictedthe evidence upon which their rights and privileges could be established. Before the passage of the restriction acts Chinese laborers could be admitted on any evidence competent under the ordinary rules of evidence; now, by the act of 1884, they are limited to the particular certificate prescribed. It was not a contract in any proper sense, but only an instrument of evidence to establish the identity of the party already entitled to certain privileges underthe compact, not between them and the United States, but between the two contracting governments. There was no mutual consideration, or discussion of the terms of a contract between the United States, and Chinese laborers, who were affected by the restriction acts. There was no meeting of two minds on the terms of an agreement. The Chinese laborers were not consulted at all in the matter. The restriction acts, and certificates provided for therein, are, simply, sovereign commands aIid prohibitions, to which the Chinese laborers affected werp. compelled to submit, willing or unwilling. To call these acts and certificates provided in pursuance thereof a contract would be an abuse of language. As between the two governments treaties are laws, and they confer rights and privileges as long as they are in force, and, doubtless. Some rights accrue and become ind{:feasibly vested by covenants or stipulations that have'ceased to be executory and have become fully executed, as in the case of title to property acquired thereunder. But we do not regard the privilege of going and coming from one country to another as of this class of rights. The being here with a right of remaining is one thing, but voluntarily going away with a right at the time to return is quite another. The right of congress to legislate in such manner as to control and repeal stipulations of treaties granting this latterdass of rights was clearly recognized in Ahliung'B Case, 9 Sawy 308, 18 Fed. Rep. 28, decided by Mr. Justice FIELD, and concurred ill by myself. Says the court: "A treaty is in its nature a contract between two nations, and by writers on law is generally so treated, and not as baving of itself the force of a legislative act. The constitution of the United States. however, plates both tleaties and laws made in pursuance thereof In the same category, and declares them to be the supreme law of the land. It does not give to eithel a paramount authority over the other. So far as a treaty operates by its own force, without legislation, it. is to be regarded by the courts as equivalent to the legislative act, but nothing fUl'ther. If the subject to which it relates be one upon which congress can also act, that body may modify its provisions, 01' supersede them entirely. The immigration of foreigners to the United States, and the conditlans upon Which they shall be permitted to remain are appropriate SUbjects Qf legislatIOn, as well as of treaty stipulation. No treaty can deprive congress of its power in that respect. As said by Mr. Justice' CURTIS, in the case of Taylor v. Morton. 'Inasmuch as treaties mllst continue to operate as part of o.Q.r Dlunicipal law, and be obeyed by the people, applied by the judiciary and executed by the president, while they continue unrepealed; and inasmuch as the power of repealing these municipal laws must reside somewhere, and nobody other than congress possesses it, then legislative power is applicable to such Jaws whenever they relate to subjects which the constitution has placed under that legislative power.' 2 Curt. 459. An act of congress then, upon
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435
a:subjl'ct within its legislative power, is as binding upon the courts as the treaty on the same subject. Both are binding except 8S the later one conflicts or interferes with the former. 'If the nation with whom we have made the treaty objects to the action of the legislative department, it may present its complaillt to the executive department, and take such other measures as it may deem that justice to its own citizens or subjects require. The courts cannot heed such complaint, nor refuse to give effect to a law of congreSs,. however much it may seem to conllict with the stipulations of the treaty. Whether a treaty has been vi"lat'd by our legislation so as to be the proper occasion of cOIlJplai nt by, the foreign government is not a jUdicial question To the courts it is simply a case of conflicting laws, the last modifying or superseding the earlier. " This same principle was stated by me again, in Ah Ping's Case, 11 Sawy. 20, 21, 23 Fed. Rep. 329. In the Head Mon(')]J 112 U. S. 598, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 247, the supreme court cites the case ofAh Lung, BUipTB, upon the point stated in the passage quoted, and approves the doctrine stated, adding:
aLBea,
"It is very difficult to understand how any different doctrine can be sustalllf'd. A treaty Is primarily a compact between independent nations. ltdepends forthll enforcement of its pwvisions on the liuerest and the honor of the governments which are parties to it. If this fail, its infraction bf'comes the subject of international negotiations and reclamatlOlls, so far as the injured party choosl's to seek which may I n the end ue enforced by actual war. It is ubvious that with all this the jUdiCIal COUl'ts have nothing to do. lind can give no redress. But a treaty may also contain provIsions which confer ('ertain rights upon the citizens or slIbj, cts of one of the natIons residillg in the terrltonallillJits of the other, Which partake of tIle nature of municipal law, and which lue capitule of enforcement as· hetween pri vate parties in the l'ourts of the COlllltry. An illustration of this character is found in treaties which regulate tile mutual rights of citizens ami suujects of the contracting nations in rt'ltard tOl'igllts of propt'rty by descent or inhentance, when the individuals ('oncel'lled are aliens. The constitution of the United states places sllch prOVisions as thl'se in the same catl'gol')' as other laws of congress, uy its deelaration that. · thitl conslitution, and the laws made in pursuance thereuf, and· all trelltiell madf' or which shall ue made under authority of the United titates, 'shall be the supreme law of the land.' A tl'eaty, then. is a law of the laud, as an act ot coJigrf'ss is. whenever its provisiuns prescnbe a rille by which the rights of thl' prl\ate citizen or subject may IJe dt:tE'rmIDl'd. And when such rights are of a nature to be enforced m a court of justice. that court resorlS to the treaty for a rule of decision for the cllse before it as it would to a statute. But even' in thIS aspect of the case there is not hing in this law which makes It irrepealable or IIntbangl'able. The constitutIon gives It no superiority over au act of congress in this respect, which may be repealld or mudified by an act of II later date. Nor is there an)thing in its essential charactl'r, 01' In the brandies of the government, by which the treaty is made, wh th gives it this superior sanctIty. ., · · In short, we are of opinion that, so fal' as a treaty malle by the United States with any forl'igll nation clln become the subject of judicial cogliizance in the courts of this country, It is suhject to such acts as congl'ess mayVass for its enforcement, modIJication or repeal."
This doctrine wnsagain repeated at the last term of the supreme court, with emphasis. in Whitney v, Robertson, 124 U. S. 193,195,8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 456. The eourt close.s the decision with these conclusions:_
436
, VEDERAL REPORTER. ,
"It follows, therefore, that when a law is clear in its provisio,ns, its validity cannot be assailed in the courts for want of conformity to stipulations of a previous treaty not already executed. Considerations of that character belong to another department of the government. The duty of the courts is to construe and give effect to the latest expression of the sovereign will."
The Oherokee Tobacco Case, 11 Wall. 616, and U. S. v. McBratney, 104 U, S. 621, 622, establish the same doctrine. See, also, U. S. v. Benzon, 2 Cliff. 513,upon the question of vested rights. We are satisfied that, under the doctrine established bythe cases cited, the act in question is valid in the respect stated in the first branch of the point under discussion. In support of the proposition, that the act is an ex IJost facto law, and, therefore, unconstitu,tional, counsel for petitioner rely upon the cases of Cummings v. Missouri, 4 WalL 277. and Ex parte Garland, Id. 333. We exalllined theq:l carefully, were familiar with those cases, but we and are of opinion that they do not touch this case. We do not find any element of an ex P08t facto law in the act now in question. There is nothmgiri the nature of an offense in a Chinaman's departing from the country, and his departure is not made an offense; and there is nothing in the nature of punishment 0,1' of a penalty imposed for the act of having departed from this country, in providing, ill the ofthe people of the United States, under'a change of public policy, that he shall not return. There IS simply a repeal by <longress cif a prior law found 1nthe stipulatIOns of the treaty with China. , We have, heretofore, found it our duty, however unpleasant,at times, to maintain, fearlessly, and steadily, the rights of.Chinese lab()rers nndel' our treaties with China. and the acts of congress passed to carry them out. That we have been right in law, is established by the fact that 'our decisions have been affirmed by the supreme court of the United ,States on ,every point of law and construction of the act that has been , raised, or ,::Uscussed before us in the courts and taken to that tribunal for its consideration. That we have been nght in fact, a8 weU aa law, in the ,view we entertaIned of the intention of congress, as expressed in, the several restriction acts, IS abundantly evidenced by the fact thata1. every session S1l1ce our construction of the acts- passed was made public in Ah 'Quan's Case, 10 Sawy 223, 21 Fed. Rep. 182, more than four years ago, congress has persistently refused to pass any law w,hich conflicted with the stipulations of our treaties with Chiua until the act now consideration was hastily passed, after the government had failed, to, '-the desired objects by further treaty stipulations without a violation of those already existing. As we faithfully enforced the laws, as'we found when they were in favor of the Chinese laborers, we deem it; equally, our duty to them in all theirIlart&, now that unfavof!i.ble to theIn., In VIe\V of occul'l;eg, erence to the administration of our treaties amI laws upon the subject ,under consideration, we deem it proper to express the hope, that, SO .long sit· upon the judgment seat, we shall bl;lendow.ed with S,ufflfilknt as courage, and firmness .to administer ,honestly,and. faithfully,
IN RE YUKG SING BEE.
437
to its true import, any valid law that congress may, in its wisdom, see fit to enact upon this, or any other, subject. That is what the judicial department of this government is established for, and when it ceases to perform its whole duty fearlessly and persistently by reason of popular clamor, or other improper outside influences, it will have ceased to perform its proper functions, and failed to answer the purposes of its creation. It is not the function of the courts to abrogate an unsatisfactory law by arbitrarily refusing to enforce it. The only proper mode of getting rid of such a law, is, for congress to repeal or modify it. We entertain no doubt that the act in question is valid, and that the petitioner is expressly forbidden by its terms to enter the United States, and that it would be unlawful for him to do so. The result is that ho is not unlawfully restrained of his liberty, and that he must be remanded; and it is .so ordered.
In re
YUNG SING HEE.
(Oircuit Oourt, D. Oregon. October 10; 1888.)
1; CHINESE-OHILDREN
A perso.iJborn in the United States of Chinese parents is, by th& ruleo! the common law, and by force of the fourteenth alllendment, a citizen of the United States, and, when restrained of his or her liberty of locomotion therein, may be delivered therefrom, on habeas corpus, by the proper national· court. .Ea; parte Ohin King, 35 Fed. Rep. 354. affirmed.
BORN IN UNITED STATES-CITIZENSHIP.
J. ;SAME-EXCLUSION . Neither of the exclusion acts of 1882, 1884, or 1888 purport to exclude from· the United States the descendants of Vhinese. born within the jurisdiction thereof. . :8. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-BILLS OF ATTAINDER-BANISHMENT. A legislative act which undertakes to inflict the punishment of banishment or exile from the United States on a citizen thereof, for any cause or no canse, or because of his race or color. is a bill of attainder within the prohibition of " the constitution, and therefore void. . ,(SyllabUS by the Oourt.)
Petition for Writ of Habeas Oorpus. Paul R. Deady, for petitioner. . . Lewis L. McArthur, for the United States. DEADY, J. The writ was allowed in this case on October 8, 1888, ;and the hearing took place on the 10th of the same month. . The petition of Yung Sing Hee states that she was born in ,San Fran.. ' on January 15, 1866, and isa citizen of the· Unitlid States; that· s4f3 is restrained of her liberty by John R. Hill, the.master of the steam-" :shjp panube, on. which she took passage from Vancouver,B. G., for . PprtJand, .or., .on October 6, .188§.;.. the c()llecton>f.customs of this'