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← 36 F.3d 916 - TBG, Inc. v. Bendis

TBG, Inc. v. Bendis’s Empirical Analysis

36 F.3d 916 · 1994

Citation profile

44
cited by 44 later decisions
May 2025
most recently cited

19 federal appellate · 5 district ·

How this case has been cited

Cited by 44 later decisions — most recently May 2025 · most notably Regents of the University of California v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc. (2007), Eichenholtz v. Brennan (1995)

19 federal appellate · 5 district ·

2001994200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 15 U.S.C. § 78I (§ 9 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934) · 15 U.S.C. § 78J (§ 10 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934) · 28 U.S.C. § 1651 · 28 U.S.C. § 294

Relies on Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp. · Local Loan Co. v. Hunt · United States v. Reliable Transfer Co. · Cruz v. Hauck · Smith v. Barry

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 44 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “Since McDermott only required proportional fault credits in admiralty cases, ... we cannot say that approving a different credit in this case was reversible error. Furthermore, the court in McDermott had the freedom to weigh and choose from various possible credits because the settlement itself did not mandate a credit.... The court in this case, however, could only approve or disapprove a settlement with a pro tanto credit. McDermott explains why courts should choose a proportional fault credit when they are free to choose and orders them to do so in admiralty, but it does not explain why approving a different credit on which a settlement depends would be an error where the Supreme Court has not mandated a proportional fault credit. Agreeing with McDermott that a pro tanto credit does not fully compensate for lost contribution rights does not lead to the conclusion that approving a pro tanto credit itself is reversible error. It does suggest that barring contribution claims to recover any difference between the credit and the settling defendants’ proportional fault would be inappropriate, but it does not explain why, since no bar order was at issue in McDermott.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “Courts that have allowed bar orders have only barred claims in which the damages are `measured by' the defendant's liability to the plaintiff. Besides contribution and indemnity claims, these include any claims in which the injury is the non-settling defendant's liability to the plaintiff. No court has authorized barring claims with independent damages.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
    e.g. Michael Gerber, Howard Mayer and Barry W. Feldman, Fred Kayne, Oppenheimer & Co., a Delaware Corporation, as Custodian for Fred Kayne Individual Retirement Accounts, Stephen Kayne, Don Wohl, Milton T. Okun, Rosemary Okun, Glenn Tobias, Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., a Delaware Corporation, as Custodian for Milton T. Okun Individual Retirement Accounts, Ken Berg, Robert A. Bronstein, Bronstein Family Trust, Bruce Burnam, Marcia Burnam, Kathleen A. Cohen, William Corbett, Cutler Family Trust of 1989, Martin Goldfarb, Richard Gunther, Harpel Partners, L.P., Harpel Wheelock Partners, L.P., Harpel International, Ltd., Richard L. Milsner, Joel Rumm, Victor Scaravilli and Tri S Partners and Todd Ellis, Joseph Meyer, Leona Moga, Terry Schultz, Eddy Sherman, Kenneth Steiner, Audree Yorkes, on Behalf of Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated v. Mtc Electronic Technologies Co., Ltd., Defendant-Counter-Defendant-Appellant, Bdo Dunwoody Ward Mallette, Defendant-Third-Party-Plaintiff-Appellee, Alan Leung, Defendant-Cross-Claimant, Hsbc Bank Canada and Ron Driol, Third Party-Defendants-Cross-Claimants-Appellees, Miko Leung, H.J. Meyers & Co., Inc. And Sit Wa Leung, Defendants-Cross-Defendants v. Daiwa Securities America, Inc., Defendant-Cross-Claimant-Appellant, Robert C. Farr Peter Jensen Thomas Lenagh Edilberto v. Pozon Goodwin Wang David Wong, Defendants-Counter-Defendants-Appellants, Levesque Securities, Inc., Meridian Securities International Limited, Maurice Lee, Canaccord Capital Corp., First Canada Securities, Leib Orlanski, Freshman, Marantz, Orlanski, Cooper & Klein, Harley Gleckman and Wall Street Financial Corp. · Gerber v. MTC Electronic Technologies Co.
  3. “Accepting that the § 10(b) contribution right attempts to ensure that liability in securities cases is distributed according to relative fault much as Reliable Transfer attempts to ensure that result in admiralty, it necessarily follows that it would be improper for a court to employ a pro tanto credit with a bar order in a § 10(b) action just as the combination is impermissible in admiralty eases.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.