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← 36 F. Supp. 2d 92 - Spetalieri v. Kavanaugh

36 F. Supp. 2d 92 - Spetalieri v. Kavanaugh’s Empirical Analysis

1998

Citation profile

14
cited by 14 later decisions
March 2019
most recently cited

4 federal appellate ·

How this case has been cited

Cited by 14 later decisions — most recently March 2019

4 federal appellate ·

90199820002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986) · 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986) · 18 U.S.C. § 2517 (Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986) · 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986) · 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986) · 28 U.S.C. § 1367 · 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act))

Relies on Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. · Brady v. State of Maryland · Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co. · Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth · New York Times Co. v. Sullivan

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 14 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “Will courts protect all cordless communications? Unfortunately neither the 1994 Act, nor its legislative history, provide a clear answer.... [T]he 1994 amendment merely removes the cordless telephone exclusion. The language that expressly extends protection to cordless phones is found in the legislative history of the 1994 Act. Nonetheless, even if courts turn to the legislative history of the Federal Wiretap Act, it may not find a clear congressional intent to protect all cordless phones. First, although the legislative history of the 1994 Act states that the protection of the ECPA is extended to cordless phones, it does not state that all cordless phones are protected. Secondly, the legislative history of the 1994 Act further states that Congress decided to extend ECPA protection after examining a wide array of communications, media, including "the newer generation of cordless phones” (phones not easily intercepted). If one reads this legislative history in conjunction with the legislative history of the ECPA, which specifically states that Congress did not extend Title III protection to cordless phones because they are so easily intercepted, it appears that there is no protection for conventional cordless telephones. Nevertheless, Congress’ willingness to protect cordless phones appears to have come only after those phones were equipped with antiinterception devices.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
  2. “makes it particularly clear that Congress did not intend to exempt non-scrambling, less sophisticated cordless telephones from the privacy protections. That Congress intended to include all cordless telephone conversations becomes particularly clear when one juxtaposes the amended version of § 2511(4)(b) with its predecessor. As originally enacted, § 2511(4)(b) covered only “cellular telephone communication[s]” and made no mention of cordless telephones. Compare P.L. 99-508, § 101(d)(2) with 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (4)(b)(ii). Further, § 2511(4)(b) reveals that Congress was aware of the distinction in the types of cordless phones available. If Congress intended to include one type of cordless telephone, but not another, it could have expressly done so. Rather, Congress amended the statute to include all cord less telephones, regardless of their sophistication.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
  3. “[i]f the offense is a first offense ... and is not for a tortious or illegal purpose or for purposes of ... commercial advantage or private commercial gain, and the wire or electronic communication with respect to which the offense under paragraph (a) is a radio communication that is not scrambled, encrypted, or transmitted using modulation techniques ... then ... [ (ii) ] if the communication is the radio portion of ... a cordless telephone communication that is transmitted between cordless telephone handset and the base unit ... the offender shall be fined under this title.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.