majority">R .B. Burns, P. J.

Louis Bailey appeals from his armed robbery1 conviction. The defendant’s sole *275objection on appeal concerns the trial testimony of a Muskegon police officer. To understand defendant’s objection it is necessary to recount the eyewitness testimony of the robbery’s victim, vis., a clerk at the Muskegon grocery store in which the robbery occurred.

The clerk identified the defendant at a pretrial lineup and at trial as one of the five armed bandits who robbed the store. The clerk’s identification of Bailey at the lineup was somewhat less than positive.2 The clerk was positive, however, in her identification of one Charles Salis as the person who. choked her and dragged her to the rear of the store during the robbery.

Subsequent to the clerk’s identification testimony, the police officer testified that Salis and Bailey had frequently associated with each other prior to the robbery. Defendant objects to this “guilt by association”3 testimony as being immaterial, irrelevant, and prejudicial.

We begin analysis of defendant’s testimonial objection by noting and giving respect to the considerable amount of judicial discretion associated with evidentiary admissibility. People v. Charles Williams (1969), 15 Mich App 683. Supporting his argument of immateriality and irrelevancy, the defendant cites the case of United States v. Smith (CA 6, 1968), 403 F2d 74. In Smith, as in this case, an issue involving testimonial evidence was presented but any further analogy to the Smith case is illusory. The objectionable testimony in Smith *276came from a prosecution witness who stated that the defendant had “just got out of the penitentiary”.4

The rule disallowing evidence of former convictions to prove a presently-charged crime is an evidentiary axiom.5People v. Matthews (1969), 17 Mich App 48. See, also, 1 Wharton, Criminal Evidence (12th ed), § 232, pp 492, 493. The testimony to which defendant objects, unlike the Smith case, involves evidence of defendant’s prior relationship to a man who was positively identified as one of the robbers. Defendant does not rely on any other case to support his contention that such evidence is incompetent. Our own analysis of the law indicates that the general rule gravitates against the defendant’s position.6

The test of evidentiary relevancy in Michigan was stated by Justice Cooley in Stewart v. People (1871), 23 Mich 63, 75:

“The proper test for the admissibility of evidence ought to be, we think, whether it has a tendency to affect belief in the mind of a reasonably cautious person, who should receive and weigh it with judicial fairness.”7 See, also, United States v. Graft (CA 6, 1969), 407 F2d 1065.

Thus, if the proffered testimony of the police officer in this case tends to establish, in the mind of a reasonably cautious person, the proposition that defendant participated in the robbery, then it is *277relevant. Such evidence need not be conclusive of the ultimate issue. A single piece of circumstantial evidence rarely proves the ultimate fact. Whitaker v. Shooting Club (1894), 102 Mich 454. Furthermore, the relevance of a given piece of evidence may in whole or in part depend on the introduction of other competent evidence. 1 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed), § 28, p 410. See, also, People v. Doyle (1870), 21 Mich 221, and People v. Lewis (1933), 264 Mich 83.

The jury performs the function of assigning persuasive values to relevant evidentiary matters, and the judicial duty of excluding evidence from this jury function should be exercised with great caution.

It is clear that identity may be proven by circumstances pointing towards one person.8 In this case the fact of prior acquaintance between Bailey and Salis would tend to affect the belief of a reasonably cautious person on the question of Bailey’s presence at the robbery. Human experience indicates that total strangers are not likely to spontaneously commit a crime together. At least a few minutes of association are necessary to communicate intentions. It is true, of course, that mere association or friendship with a felon does not prove one guilty of committing a crime with him, but it cannot be contradicted that the friend or associate is more likely a suspect than a complete stranger.

In People v. Tucker (1969), 19 Mich App 320, evidence that defendant’s dog was present at the home of the rape victim was certainly less than conclusive on the question of defendant’s guilt, yet it was admitted for jury consideration. The probative value of the evidence in Tuckerand in this case may be *278slight, hut as long as its admission tends to cast a shadow of guilt it must be admitted for the jury’s determination as to the extent of that shadow.

The evidence that Bailey and Salis were associates before the crime, when considered along with the positive identification of Salis as one of the robbers, would tend to support the not-so-positive identification of Bailey. Such a tendency renders this testimonial evidence relevant.

The defendant’s objection on the ground of “materiality” is without merit since the evidence was introduced to prove a matter in issue.9

We cannot perceive of any countervailing policy of why, even though relevant, this evidence should not have been presented for the jury’s consideration. See People v. Jordan (1970), 23 Mich App 375.

Affirmed.

Holbrook, J., concurred.

MCLA § 750.529 (Stat Ann 1971 Cum Supp § 28.797).

In identifying Bailey as one of the culprits the clerk exclaimed that Bailey “looks like him.”

Defendant’s reliance on the phrase “guilt by association” is misplaced since it has historically been used in situations where a particular association in itself has been labeled criminal. The phrase has never been applied to matters of evidentiary relevance. See 3 Wharton, Criminal Law and Procedure, § 959, p 106.

United States v. Smith (CA6, 1968), 403 F2d 74, 75.

Unless such crimes come within the plan, scheme, or design exception. See MOLA § 768.27 (Stat Ann 1954 Rev § 28.1050).

The general rule as stated in 22A CJS, Criminal Law, § 608, pp 415, 416, approves of evidence showing the prior relationship between the accused and an accomplice.

Cf. People v. Lewis (1933), 264 Mich 83, 88, and Ames v. Mac-Phail (1939), 289 Mich 185, 192. The definition of relevancy has varied from state to state but according to one prominent author the Michigan rule is consistent with the most acceptable test. McCormick, Evidence, § 152, p 318, fn 23.

People v. Sullivan (1939), 290 Mich 414; People v. Tucker (1969), 19 Mich App 320.

For the technical distinctions between the words “relevant” and “material” see McCormick, Evidence, § 152, p 315, and 4 Callaghan’s Michigan Pleading & Practice, § 36.188, p 16.

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