Dillard v. Shattuck’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

28 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 28 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““ * * * In determining this question the article alone must be construed, stripped of all insinuations, innuendo, colloquium and explanatory circumstances. To be libelous per se, the writing must be dafamatory on its face and such a meaning must be deduced ‘within the four corners thereof.’ * * * Furthermore the defamatory meaning must be the only one of which the questioned writing is susceptible. * * * * * * % * * “Furthermore, the statements claimed to be libelous, if such per se, must carry but a single meaning, and it an opprobrious or defamatory one. The language said to be libelous should be given its plain and natural meaning and be viewed by the court as other people reading it would ordinarily understand and give it meaning. Nor may any special knowledge of the facts, possessed by the parties concerned, be brought to bear to give meaning to the words said to be libelous. They are to be construed as a stranger might view them without the aid of any such knowledge as that possessed by the parties mentioned. * * * ””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Hoeck v. Tiedebohl

2. ““Finally, it should be borne in mind, as an established distinction, that oral defamation is more strictly construed than is libel. 36 C.J. 1157; 17 R.C.L. 266; Jones v. Jones, (1916) 2 A.C. 401, 10 British Ruling Cases, 511, and case note at page 543. The reason for this distinction is obvious. Written slander, by reason of its wider circulation and enduring form, is calculated to inflict greater permanent injury to character, and suggests stronger malice by reason of its studied preparation.” 36 N.M. at 205 , 11 P.2d at 545 .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Reed v. Melnick

3. ““It is true that slanderous statements which would not be actionable per se when spoken of a person as an individual may become so when spoken of the same person in relation to his trade, profession, or business. When so spoken it is unnecessary to allege or prove special damage.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Reed v. Melnick