36 Ohio App. 3d 213 - State v. Arvanitis’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

20 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 20 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““Based on the facts of this case, we are not disposed to announce a hard and fast rule as to whether counsel’s failure to inform an alien defendant of deportation consequences of a guilty plea is ‘a substantial violation of any of defense counsel’s essential duties to his client’ so as to render counsel’s assistance ineffective under State v. Lytle [ (1976) ], supra [ 48 Ohio St.2d 391 , 2 O.O.3d 495 , 358 N.E.2d 623 ], and Strickland v. Washington [ (1984) ], supra [ 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 ]. Instead, we hold that the incompetence alleged here, if indeed it was incompetence, did not cause defendant substantial prejudice. Put another way, defendant’s plea was not influenced by counsel’s failure to inform him of deportation consequences; and without this influence, defendant’s plea was not involuntary.” Arvanitis, 36 Ohio App.3d at 218 [ 522 N.E.2d at 1094-1095 ].”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. 80 Ohio App. 3d 329 - State v. Odubanjo · State v. Passafiume

2. ““ ‘The longstanding test for determining the validity of a guilty plea is “whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.” * * * Where, as here, a defendant is represented by counsel during the plea process and enters his plea upon the advice of counsel, the voluntariness of the plea depends on whether counsel’s advice “was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.” * * * [A] defendant who pleads guilty upon the advice of counsel “may only attack the voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty plea by showing that the advice he received from counsel was not within the standards set forth in McMann [v. Richardson (1970), 397 U.S. 759 , 90 S.Ct. 1441 , 25 L.Ed.2d 763 ].” * * * ’ “The federal courts have consistently held that actual knowledge of the collateral consequences of a guilty plea is not a prerequisite to the entry of a knowing and intelligent plea; and, therefore, the defendant’s ignorance of the possibility of deportation does not render a guilty plea involuntary. United States v. Campbell [(11th Cir.1985)] supra [ 778 F.2d 764 ], at 768; United States v. Gavilan [(5th Cir.1985)], supra [ 761 F.2d 226 ], at 228; United States v. Santelises [ (2d Cir.1975) ], supra [ 509 F.2d 703 ], at 704.” Arvanitis, 36 Ohio App.3d at 217 [ 522 N.E.2d at 1093-1094 ].”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. 80 Ohio App. 3d 329 - State v. Odubanjo

3. “Although the rule itself [Crim.R. 32.1] does not provide for a time limit after the imposition of sentence, during which a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty must be made, it has been held that an undue delay between the occurrence of the alleged cause for withdrawal and the filing of the motion is a factor adversely affecting the credibility of the movant and militating against the granting of the motion.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. State v. Meadows, Unpublished Decision (11-22-2006)