State v. Spisak’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

4 federal appellate · 78 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 86 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Of the mitigating factors specified in R.C. 2929.04(b) appellant relied solely on his allegations that he lacked, due to a mental disease or defect, substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the law at the time of committing the offense. Although there was testimony that appellant had characteristics of borderline and schizotypal personality disorders, the bulk of the testimony, from both defense and rebuttal expert witnesses, established that appellant was sane at the time of the acts, that he could have refrained from committing them, had he so chosen, and that he understood the nature of his acts but elected to carry them out anyway. Appellant admitted to being the principal offender in three murders and two attempted murders. He did not have a significant history of prior criminal convictions or juvenile adjudications, nor was his age a factor. He was not under duress, coercion or strong provocation at the time of the crimes. His victims neither facilitated nor induced the offense. Nothing in the nature and circumstances of these deliberate murders tempers the gravity of the offenses. We concur with the jury and lower courts that the balance of these factors lies heavily, and beyond reasonable doubts, on the side of the aggravating circumstances of which the appellant was convicted.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Spisak v. Mitchell

2. “Proceeding to our independent weighing of the aggravating circumstances and mitigating factors presented herein, we note that appellant’s three aggravated murder convictions specify fifteen separate aggravating circumstances under R.C. 2929.04. However, as pointed out by appellant in his first proposition of law, for purposes of sentencing the doctrine of merger herein applies. Each aggravated murder ' count should thus contain only one specification that appellant’s acts were part of a course of conduct involving the purposeful killing of or attempt to kill two or more persons. R.C. 2929.04(A)(5). Similarly, specifications pursuant to R.C. 2929.04(A)(3) (escaping detection, apprehension, trial or punishment) and R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) (felony murder) are duplicative of and thus merge with R.C. 2929.04(A)(5), since these aggravating circumstances arise from the same indivisible course of conduct. Although the court of appeals did not apply the merger doctrine below, we have determined that the jury’s consideration of the duplicative aggravating circumstances during sentencing did not affect their verdict. Furthermore, we have independently determined that the remaining aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Spisak v. Mitchell