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← 36 U.S. 213 - Waters v. Merchants' Louisville Insurance

Waters v. Merchants' Louisville Insurance’s Empirical Analysis

36 U.S. 213 · 1837

Citation profile

99
cited by 99 later decisions
17
cited 17 times by the Supreme Court
16
states following
December 2018
most recently cited

34 federal appellate · 2 district · 35 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 99 later decisions (17 by the Supreme Court) — most recently December 2018 · most notably 134 S. Ct. 1377 - Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc. (2014), Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc. (2014)

34 federal appellate · 2 district · 35 state decisions — followed in 16 states

1801837184018501860187018801890190019101920193019401950196019701980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on The Columbia Insurance Company of Alexandria, in Error v. Joseph W. Lawrence, Who Survived Thomas Poindexter · The Patapsco Insurance Company v. John Coulter · Sturm v. . Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co. · Grim v. Phœnix Insurance

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 99 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “a well established principle of [the common] law, that in all cases of loss, we are to attribute it to the proximate cause, and not to any remote cause.”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. ““His lordship might have stated the argument from inconvenience, even in a more general form. If negligence of the master or crew were under such circumstances a good defense, it would be perfectly competent and proper to examine oa the trial any single transaction of the whole voyage, and every incident of the navigation of the whole voyage, whether there was due diligence in all respects, in hoisting or taking in sail, in steering the course, in trimming the ship, in selecting the route, in stopping in port, in hastening or retarding the operations of the voyage; for all these might be remotely connected with the loss. If there had been more diligence, or less negligence, the peril might have been avoided or escaped, or never encountered at all. Under such circumstances, the chance of a recovery upon a policy for any loss, from any peril insured against, would of itself be a result of no inconsiderable hazard.””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. ““No .decision * * * can be cited, wherein such a case [the loss by a peril of the sea], the underwriters had been held to be excused in consequence of the loss having been remotely occasioned by the negligence of the crew. I am afraid of laying down any such a rule. It will introduce an infinite number of questions, as to the quantum of care, which, if used, might have prevented the loss. Suppose, for instance, the master were to send a man to the masthead to look out, and he falls asleep, in consequence of which the vessel runs upon a rock, or is taken by the enemy; in that case it might be argued, as here, that the loss was imputable to the negligence of one of the crew, and that the underwriters are not liable. Those, and a variety of other such questions would be introduced, in case our opinion were in favor of the underwriters.””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.