Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist

36 Wis. 409

Massing v. Ames

Wisconsin Supreme Court

Decided June 15, 1874

Wisconsin Supreme Court · decided 1874-06-15

This action was brought to restrain the treasurer of Dane county from selling a large number of lots in the city of Madison, belonging to the plaintiff, for the unpaid taxes thereon for the year 1871, and to set aside such taxes. There was assessed on all of such lots in that year a general tax, and on different portions of them five special taxes or assessments, all of which are alleged to be void for reasons stated in the complaint.

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1874-06-15

How this case has been cited

Cited by 3 later decisions — most recently March 1934

3 state decisions

101874188018901900191019201930decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

Lyon, J.

¶1The appeal is prematurely taken, and must be dismissed. The paper in the record in the form of a judgment, and from which the appeal is taken, is not a judgment. A judgment, under our present practice, is defined to be “ the final determination of the rights of the parties in the action.” R. S., ch. 182, sec. 25. Here there has been no final determination of such rights. If the plaintiff redeems the lots affected *412by the illegal assessments, from the general taxes and the sewer assessments thereon, within the time fixed by the coart, judgment will be entered granting her the relief demanded in the complaint as to such lots. If she fails so to redeem, judgment will be entered dismissing the complaint. In either case the court must determine and adjudicate whether the lots have or have not been so redeemed, and a future judgment must be entered.

¶2Under the old practice, this document might have been denominated an interlocutory judgment. But that form of judgment is unknown to the code. Belmont v. Ponvert, 3 Robertson, 696, and cases cited. -At most it is only an order (R. S.,. ch. 140, sec. 28); and as an order it was entirely unnecessary. It merely specifies, in the alternative, the terms and conditions of the judgment to be thereafter entered. The same thing had already been done in the conclusions of law, and the so-called judgment added nothing thereto. It must, therefore, be regarded as a nullity.

¶3The correct practice is for either party, after the expiration of the time for redemption fixed by the court, on notice to the other party, to make proof of the redemption, or failure to redeem, as the case may be, and to apply to the court for judgment Either party may appeal from the judgment entered pursuant to such application; but no appeal lies from the conclusions of law, or from an unnecessary order merely reaffirming such conclusions, but not finally determining the action.

¶4Under the circumstances of the case, we think that the circuit court may properly grant the plaintiff (if she desire it) a reasonable time after the remittitur shall be filed in that court, within which to make such redemption.

¶5By the Court. — Appeal dismissed.

/36/wis/409 · .json · Public domain