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← 360 F.2d 353 - Moore v. United States

Moore v. United States’s Empirical Analysis

360 F.2d 353 · 1965

Citation profile

141
cited by 141 later decisions
3
cited 3 times by the Supreme Court
1
states following
October 2019
most recently cited

52 federal appellate · 4 district · 1 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 141 later decisions (3 by the Supreme Court) — most recently October 2019 · most notably Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation (1971), Stone v. Commissioner (1971)

52 federal appellate · 4 district · 1 state decisions

370196519701980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 26 U.S.C. § 6013 · 26 U.S.C. § 6653 · 26 U.S.C. § 7201

Relies on Commissioner v. Sunnen · Helvering v. Mitchell · Linkletter v. Walker · Helvering v. Mitchell · United States v. Scharton

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 141 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “the determination of an exact liability was not essential to the judgment, a prerequisite to the application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel.”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “larger quantum of proof required in a criminal evasion case”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “We conclude, however, that the wife, who was not a party to the criminal proceeding, should not he estopped by the finding of fraud against her husband * * * We are mindful of what may be a contrary position taken by the Tax Court in Thomas Worcester, Inc. v. Commissioner, P-H Memo. T.C. par. 65,199 (1965). There the court stated that: “Even if we were to agree with Elizabeth [the wife] that she is not collaterally estopped by the prior criminal conviction of Thomas [her husband] to deny fraud in the instant case, her liability on the fraud issue (being joint and several) would still be controlled by a finding of fraud against Thomas. In other words, it would be completely meaningless, where a joint return has been filed, to reach contradictory results on an issue of fraud.” We agree that Mrs. Moore’s joint liability with her husband arises not from her personal fraud, but from that of her husband, but for a finding of fraud on his part to bind her, it must be made in a proceeding to which she is a party. This requirement cannot be satisfied by invoking the estoppel which Mr. Moore’s prior criminal conviction works against him, for Mrs. Moore was not a party to the criminal proceeding. Due process requires that she be accorded her day in court on the issue of her husband’s fraud. Her right in the civil proceeding to contest her husband’s fraud may not be denied by pointing to her husband’s prior criminal conviction, nor should his conviction prejudice her position in the civi”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.