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← 360 Pa. 332 - Simodejka v. Williams

Simodejka v. Williams’s Empirical Analysis

1948

Citation profile

90
cited by 90 later decisions
5
states following
June 1989
most recently cited

8 federal appellate · 66 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 90 later decisions — most recently June 1989 · most notably Keitz v. National Paving & Contracting Co. (1957), Fisher v. Hill (1951)

8 federal appellate · 66 state decisions

50019481950196019701980decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Vinnacombe v. Phila. Am. S. · Wallace's Estate · Rau v. Manko · Fields v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co. · Pearlman v. Truppo

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 90 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““. . . when B [Ratcliff] sued M [Myers] who brought in W [Yost], M [Myers] became a plaintiff as against W [Yost]; in other words, as the rule provided, they became adverse parties as to each other as much as the original defendants were adverse to the original plaintiffs. In such circumstances, if the jury should find [as it did find] that M [Myers] and W [Yost] were joint tortfeasors, M [Myers] became entitled to contribution from W [Yost] and was entitled to get it in this action. One of the issues between W [Yost] andM [Myers] for decision in the case therefore was whether there should be contribution. If one of the elements of M’s [Myers] cause of action against W [Yost] was a right to recover for personal injury, M [Myers] should have claimed for it in his complaint against W [Yost] as additional defendant ... he may not split his cause of action, i.e., W’s [Yost] negligent driving, into two parts and bring two suits and get contribution in one and personal injury damage in another suit. . . . The purpose of the rule, as has been stated, was to prevent such multiplicity of suits; M’s [Myers] right to personal injury damages should have been tried with the other rights resulting from the collision. Not having chosen to claim all his damages in the prior action the omitted element became merged in the judgment. . . .””
    4 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. ““(a) The procedure, including pleadings, between the party joining an additional defendant and the additional defendant shall be the same as though the party joining the additional defendant were a plaintiff and the additional defendant were a defendant”.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  3. ““One of the purposes of third party procedure is to avoid multiplicity of suits by adjudicating in one suit the rights and liabilities of all the parties to a single transaction which constitutes the cause of the action. . . . The rules of civil procedure are remedial, expressly intended to avoid multiplicity of suits, and therefore should be liberally construed to accomplish the purpose for which they were adopted”: Simodejka v. Williams, 360 Pa. 332, 333 (1948).”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.