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← 361 F.2d 581 - William J. Bauers, Jr. v. Herbert T. Heisel, Jr

William J. Bauers, Jr. v. Herbert T. Heisel, Jr’s Empirical Analysis

361 F.2d 581 · 1966

Citation profile

292
cited by 292 later decisions
2
cited 2 times by the Supreme Court
11
states following
September 2018
most recently cited

141 federal appellate · 21 district · 22 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 292 later decisions (2 by the Supreme Court) — most recently September 2018 · most notably Imbler v. Pachtman (1976), Pierson v. Ray (1967)

141 federal appellate · 21 district · 22 state decisions — followed in 11 states

1910196619701980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act))

Relies on Baker v. Carr · Monroe v. Pape · Powell v. State of Alabama Patterson · Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority · Dombrowski v. Pfister

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 292 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “* * * his office is vested with a vast quantum of discretion which is necessary for the vindication of the public interest. In this respect, it is imperative that he enjoy the same freedom and independence of action as that which is accorded members of the bench.”
    7 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. ““. . . [JJudges of courts of superi- or or general jurisdiction are not liable to civil actions for their judicial acts, even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, and are alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly. A distinction must be here observed between excess of jurisdiction and the clear absence of all jurisdiction over the subject-matter. Where there is clearly no jurisdiction over the subject-matter, any authority exercised is a usurped authority, and for the exercise of such authority, when the want of jurisdiction is known to the judge, no excuse is permissible. . Thus, if a probate court, invested only with authority over wills and the settlement of estates of deceased persons, should proceed to try parties for public offences, jurisdiction over the subject of offences being entirely wanting in the court, and this being necessarily known to its judge, his commission would afford no protection to him in the exercise of the usurped authority. But if, on the other hand, a judge of a criminal court, invested with general criminal jurisdiction over offences committed within a certain district, should hold a particular act to be a public offence, which is not by the law made an offence, and proceed to the arrest and trial of a party charged with such act, or should sentence a party convicted to a greater punishment than that authorized by the law upon its proper construction, no personal liability to civil action for such acts would attach to the ”
    4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “[R]eason requires us to adopt a rule which does not provide immunity for those acts which are done clearly outside the authority or jurisdiction of the office.”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.