361 So. 2d 215 - State v. Dalby’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

12 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 12 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “... the word `therein' requires that the offense must be capable of being committed within the vehicle ...”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 376 So. 2d 285 - State v. Hankins · 763 So. 2d 1101 - Jones v. State

2. “entering or remaining in a structure or a conveyance with the intent to commit an offense therein . .”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Harley · 586 So. 2d 1073 - State v. Stephens

3. “In Thayer v. State, 335 So.2d 815, 817 (Fla. 1976), the supreme court said, `The law clearly requires that the legislative intent be determined primarily from the language of the statute because a statute is to be taken, construed and applied in the form enacted. Van Pelt v. Hilliard, 75 Fla. 792 , 78 So. 693 (1918); Vocelle v. Knight Bros. Paper Co., 118 So.2d 664 (Fla. 1st DCA 1960). The reason for this rule is that the Legislature must be assumed to know the meaning of words and to have expressed its intent by the use of the words found in the statute.' Here there is no ambiguity in the language of the statute. Burglary occurs when there is entering with intent to commit any offense. Consequently, we must assume that the legislature intended for a person to be guilty of burglary of a conveyance when he enters the conveyance with the intent to steal it. (emphasis in original)”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 586 So. 2d 1073 - State v. Stephens