Orser v. United States’s Empirical Analysis
362 F.2d 580 · 1966
Citation profile
56 federal appellate · 3 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 61 later decisions — most recently April 2009 · most notably United States v. Haldeman (1976), United States v. Moore (1975)
56 federal appellate · 3 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Pereira v. United States · Glidden Company v. Zdanok Et Al. · Bollenbach v. United States · Fiswick v. United States · Wiborg v. United States
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 61 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““Possession of property recently stolen, if not satisfactorily explained, is a circumstance from which the jury may reasonably draw the inference and find that the person in possession knew the property had been stolen. “Possession in one state of property recently stolen in another state, if not satisfactorily explained, is a circumstance from which the jury might reasonably infer and find in the light of surrounding circumstances that the person in possession not only knew it to be stolen property, but also transported or caused it to be transported in Interstate Commerce. “The term, ‘recently’ is a relative term which has no fixed meaning. Whether property may be considered as recently stolen, depends upon the nature of the property and all the facts and circumstances shown by the evidence. The longer the period of time since the theft, the weaker the inference which may be drawn from unexplained possession. “If you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the motor vehicle described in the indictment was stolen, and was transported in Interstate Commerce as charged, and that, while recently stolen, the property was in the possession of the accused in another State than that in which it was stolen, the jury would be justified in drawing from those facts the inference that the motor vehicle was transported or caused to be transported in Interstate Commerce by the accused with knowledge that it was stolen, unless possession of the recently stolen property by the”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“"The declarations of one conspirator made in furtherance of the objects of the conspiracy, and during its existence, are admissible against all members of the conspiracy. Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263 , 12 S.Ct. 617 , 36 L.Ed. 429 . But a defendant's connection with a conspiracy cannot be established by the extra-judicial declarations of a co-conspirator, made out of the presence of the defendant. There must be proof aliunde of the existence of the conspiracy, and of the defendant's connection with it, before such statements become admissible as against a defendant not present when they were made. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 74 , 62 S.Ct. 457 , 86 L.Ed. 680, 701 ; Minner v. United States, 10 Cir., 57 F.2d 506 ; May v. United States, 84 U.S.App.D.C. 233 , 175 F.2d 994 ; United States v. Nardone, 2 Cir., 106 F.2d 41 , reversed on other grounds, 308 U.S. 338 , 60 S.Ct. 266 , 84 L.Ed. 307 ". (Emphasis in text).”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.