Friedman v. Lubecki’s Empirical Analysis
1987
Citation profile
10 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 10 later decisions — most recently June 2019
10 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Martino v. TRANSPORT WRKERS'UN. OF PHIL. · Alexander v. Mastercraft Construction Co. · 301 Pa. Super. 161 - Martino v. Transport Workers Union Local 234
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 10 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“[The] appellee was required to invoke her remedy under Pa.R.C.P.[M.]D.J. [No.] 1006 before [the] appellants filed their untimely [c]omplaint in Common Pleas Court. Rule 1006 speaks in terms of striking the appeal . This, in our view, contemplates a situation where the [c]omplaint has not yet been filed. Once [the] appellants had filed their [c]omplaint, it was then too late for [the] appellee to seek relief under Rule 1006, even though the [c]omplaint was unseasonable. She had, by then, lost the race to the Courthouse . We repeat, Rule 1006 is not self-enforcing. Its effect is not automatically triggered even if, after 20 days have passed, an appellant has not filed his [c]omplaint. In that event, it is incumbent upon an appellee to proceed under Rule 1006 to strike the appeal from the record. Rule 1006 only provides for the striking of an appeal filed pursuant to Pa.R.C.P.[M.]D.J. [No.] 1002. We discern no language in Rule 1006 which encompasses within its terms the striking of an untimely filed [c]omplaint, as well, nor will we read any such requirement into a Rule which clearly on its face provides for a method by which an appeal is to be stricken from the record for failure to comply with Pa.R.C.P.[M.]D.J. [No.] 1004A. As we have stated earlier, this rule mandates the filing of a [c]omplaint within 20 days of the taking of an appeal from the judgment of a [d]istrict [j]ustice.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage““We note that appellee filed her praecipe to strike after appellants’ complaint had already been filed in common pleas court. If appellee expected that appellants be santioned by not having their appeal processed to ultimate determination, her remedy, immediately available after the 20-day period had passed for appellants to timely file their complaint pursuant to Pa.R.C.P.D.J. 1004A, was to praecipe, at the time, to strike the appeal as provided by Pa.R.C.P.D.J. 1006 . . . Rule 1006 is not self-enforcing. Therefore, it became the duty of appel-lee, upon default of appellants, to praecipe to strike the appeal.” Friedman at 502 , 524 A.2d at 988-9 . (emphasis in original)”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage“must be invoked before " an appellant files his or her complaint in the trial court and that "to hold otherwise would frustrate the purpose of Rule 1006 which, ..., by its terms, is to punish an appellant for failure to file his [c]omplaint pursuant to Rule 1004A.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.