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362 So. 2d 10

Docket Nos. 53675 to 53680.

State v. Allen

STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Roosevelt ALLEN, Larry W. Edwards, Randy Heath, Elmore L. Henderson, Wallace Reed, Willie Singletary and Herman Cruse, Appellees.

Supreme Court of Florida

Decided July 20, 1978.

Rehearing Denied September 27, 1978.

Supreme Court of Florida · decided 1978-07-20

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“(1) A person is guilty of theft if he obtains or uses, or endeavors to obtain or to use, the property of another with intent: (a) To deprive the other person of a right to the property or a benefit therefrom. (b) To appropriate the property to his own use or to the use of any person not entitled thereto. (2)(a) If the property stolen is of the value of $20,000 or more, the offender shall be guilty of grand theft in the first degree, punishable as a felony of the second degree, as provided in ss. 775.082, 775.083, and 775.084. (b) It is grand theft of the second degree and a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in ss. 775.082, 775.083, and 775.084, if the property stolen is: 1. Valued at $100 or more, but less than $20,000. 2. A will, codicil, or other testamentary instrument. 3. A firearm. 4. A motor vehicle. 5. Any member of the genus Bos (cattle) or the genus Equus (horse), or any hybrid of the specified genera. 6. Any fire extinguisher. (c) Theft of any property not specified in paragraph (a) or paragraph (b) is petit theft and a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083. Upon a second conviction for petit theft, the offender shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083. Upon a third or subsequent conviction for petit theft, the offender shall be guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in ss. 775.082, 775.083, and 775.084.”

quoted by 5 later decisions, including Hilty v. State, Jones v. State

“an overt act manifesting criminal intent.”

quoted by 4 later decisions, including Padgett v. State, 370 So. 2d 1142 - State v. Tomas

Relies on 343 So. 2d 9 - State v. Bales

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1978-07-20

How this case has been cited

Cited by 125 later decisions — most recently August 2013 · most notably 538 So. 2d 820 - Chestnut v. State (1989), 364 So. 2d 1217 - Dunnigan v. State (1978)

123 state decisions

87019781980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1*11 Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Calvin L. Fox, Asst. Atty. Gen., Miami, for appellant.

¶2Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and Karen M. Gottlieb and Elliot H. Scherker, Asst. Public Defenders, and Melvin Schaffer of Pilafian & Schaffer, Miami, for appellees.

¶3PER CURIAM.

¶4By consolidated appeals from the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit, we are asked to review substantially identical orders which passed upon the constitutionality of Florida's theft statute, Section 812.014(1), Florida Statutes (1977).[1] The trial judge, in granting appellees' motions to dismiss the informations charging them with various offenses under that provision, concluded that the legislature's revision of the statute to encompass other activities[2] left it worded in such a way as to render it unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. We reverse.

¶5Section 812.014(1) provides:

"A person is guilty of theft if he obtains or uses, or endeavors to obtain or to use, the property of another with intent:
(a) To deprive the other person of a right to the property or a benefit therefrom.
(b) To appropriate the property to his own use or to the use of any person not entitled thereto."

¶6The trial judge found two features of the statute to be fatally defective. First, noting that the predecessor larceny statute specifically proscribed commission of the offense "with unlawful intent,"[3] she ruled that the legislature's deletion of the word "unlawful" in this revised provision had the effect of eliminating the element of specific criminal intent, thereby contravening the requirements of due process. Second, she found that the term "endeavors" as used in Section 812.014(1) was impermissibly vague.

¶7We find no evidence to support the notion that the 1977 legislature intended by its omission of the word "unlawful" to eliminate specific criminal intent as an element of this offense.[4] At best, the deletion of that term signifies a return to the state of the law existing before 1975, when the immediate predecessor to Section 812.014(1) took effect.[5] For 24 years prior to that time, the jurisprudence of this state recognized the element of specific criminal intent as a necessary requisite to a larceny conviction, notwithstanding that the larceny statute during that period, as now, lacked an express directive that the intent be "unlawful."[6]

¶8*12 As regards the asserted vagueness of the statute, it is obvious that the term "endeavors" means an overt act manifesting criminal intent, rather than merely the formulation of a mental intent. The trial court's construction of the statute to the contrary is unduly technical.

¶9The orders of the trial court, dismissing the informations against appellees, are reversed, and these cases are remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

¶10It is so ordered.

¶11ENGLAND, C.J., and ADKINS, BOYD, OVERTON, HATCHETT and ALDERMAN, JJ., concur.

NOTES

¶12[1] We have jurisdiction by virtue of Article V, Section 3(b)(1), Florida Constitution.

¶13[2] Section 812.014(1) was enacted by the 1977 legislature as part of the overall revision of the criminal statutes relating to theft and stolen property. Ch. 77-342, § 4, Laws of Fla. As indicated by its title, the Florida Anti-Fencing Act (Section 812.005, Florida Statutes (1977)), one object of this legislation was to expand the larceny statute to reach "fencing" of stolen goods and attempted larceny.

¶14[3] § 812.021(1), Fla. Stat. (1975). This section was repealed simultaneously with the enactment of the present statute. Ch. 77-342, § 16, Laws of Fla.

¶15[4] This resolution obviates consideration of whether this statute involves constitutionally protected expression and is thus subject to challenge on the basis of asserted overbreadth. See, e.g., State v. Bales, 343 So.2d 9 (Fla. 1977).

¶16[5] Ch. 74-383, §§ 40 and 67, Laws of Fla.

¶17[6] Compare § 811.021(1), Fla. Stat. (1951) with § 812.021(1), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1974).

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