Owens v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

37 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 37 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[I]t is the responsibility of the party opposing the strike to move the matter forward at the third stage of the process and to meet the burden of persuasion. This is not the trial court’s responsibility, as the trial court can only inquire into the evidence that is made available to it. According to this court, if the party opposing the strike does not present more evidence, no additional inquiry by the trial court is required.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Weston v. State · 2009 Ark. App. 414 - Hammock v. State

2. “Step One. Prima facie case. The strike’s opponent must present facts, at this initial step, to raise an inference of purposeful discrimination. According to the Batson decision, that is done by showing (1) that the strike’s opponent is a member of an identifiable racial group, (2) that the strike is part of a jury-selection process or pattern designed to discriminate, and (3) that the strike was used to exclude jurors because of their race. In deciding whether a prima facie case has been made, the trial court should consider all relevant circumstances. Should the trial court determine that a prima facie case has been made, the inquiry proceeds to Step Two. However, if the determination by the trial court is to the contrary, that ends the inquiry. • Step Two. Racially neutral explanation. Assuming the strike’s opponent has made a prima facie case, the burden of producing a racially neutral explanation shifts to the proponent of the strike. (But, again, the burden of persuading the trial court that a Batson violation of purposeful discrimination has occurred never leaves the strike’s opponent.) This explanation, according to Batson, must be more than a mere denial of discrimination or an assertion that a shared race would render the challenged juror partial to the one opposing the challenge. Under Purkett [v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765 (1995) (per curiam)], this explanation need not be persuasive or even plausible. Indeed, it may be silly or superstitious. The reason will be deemed rac”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Weston v. State