Blau v. Lamb’s Empirical Analysis
363 F.2d 507 · 1966
Citation profile
49 federal appellate · 3 district · 2 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 102 later decisions (2 by the Supreme Court) — most recently August 2018 · most notably Kern County Land Company v. Occidental Petroleum Corporation (1973), Reliance Electric Company v. Emerson Electric Company (1972)
49 federal appellate · 3 district · 2 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 15 U.S.C. § 78A (§ 1 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934) · 15 U.S.C. § 78B (§ 2 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934) · 15 U.S.C. § 78C (§ 3 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934) · 15 U.S.C. § 78P (§ 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934)
Relies on Sweet v. United States · Blau v. Lehman · Cella v. United States · Smolowe v. Delendo Corp. · Monrosa v. Carbon Black Export, Inc.
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 102 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“[f]or the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his relationship to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase and sale, or any sale and purchase, of any equity security of such issuer ... within any period of less than six months ... shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any intention on the part of such beneficial owner, director, or officer in entering into such transaction....”
6 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority““Congress adopted the sweeping, arbitrary regulatory mechanism embodied in Section 16(b) in order to insure that even the possibility of insider abuse was deterred, but it would seem to follow that in order to avoid ‘purposeless harshness’ a court should first inquire whether a given transaction could possibly tend to accomplish the practices Section 16(b) was designed to prevent. . . . Frequently this initial inquiry will convince a court that the transaction in question held out at least the possibility of abuse; in such cases Section 16(b)’s regulatory mechanism requires that the section be applied without further inquiry. In some cases, however, this critical inquiry will convince a court that the conversion transaction in question could not possibly have lent itself to insider abuse. In such a case it is not inconsistent with Section 16(b)’s regulatory mechanism to hold that the section does not apply.” (emphasis added).”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“different forms of the same participation in [the] issuer,”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.