Conroy v. Shott’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

5 federal appellate · 1 district · 3 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 43 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““Defendant argues that even if Stickler intended to defraud other creditors in making payments to defendant, plaintiff is precluded from recovery under the construction given O.R.C. § 1313.56 (then R.S. § 6343) by the Supreme Court of Ohio in the venerable case of National Bank of Commerce v. Getting- er, 68 Ohio St. 389 , 67 N.E. 739 (1903). While the syllabus would seem to give some support to defendant’s position, the opinion underscores a difference in factual pattern in the following language: ‘In the case at bar there is no averment in the amended petition that the defendants below acted in bad faith, or had notice of the insolvency of (the debtor), or received more money from him than he owed them, or that they knew that he had made the said payments in contemplation of insolvency, or to create a preference, or to hinder, delay or defraud his creditors * * * There is no affirmant that the persons receiving said payments knew of his said intent and purposes, and, therefore, said petition by its silence, concedes that they acted in good faith, and without notice, in receiving said payments.’ Having concluded that at the very least defendant should have known Stickler’s fraudulent intent, the lack of application of Gettinger is readily apparent. Further reading of the opinion demonstrates that the Ohio Supreme Court intended that one receiving preferential payment was to be given protection only if he acted ‘in good faith,’ on the basis of ‘for fair value’ and received ‘p”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Roberds, Inc. v. Broyhill Furniture (In Re Roberds, Inc.)

2. “It will be immediately noted than an intent to defraud on the part of [the debtor operating the Ponzi scheme] must first be presumed to have existed, but a quick review of the facts clearly establish that no doubt as to such intent can exist. [The debtor’s] scheme was the essence of simplicity, not to say of stupidity. At its inception he borrowed from A, then borrowed from B to repay A. The inducement to B was a high rate of interest on a short term, whereupon it became necessary to borrow from C to repay B. This operation continued, with ever increasing rates of interest and shortening of the loan periods until hundreds of transactions involving millions of dollars had been entered into by [the debtor]. However, since he was insolvent from the moment of the making of the first loan, and since there has never been a suggestion that any source of income existed except new loans (if such may be considered “a source of income”), the question of intent to defraud is not debatable.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Perkins v. Lehman Bros., Inc. (In re International Management Associates, LLC)

3. “The record discloses 600 or more transactions between defendant and the bankrupt, which presumably involved many loans, credits and repayments. The record does not demonstrate to our satisfaction that the cumulative total of $1,363,410 is the correct basis for judgment. 3”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Conroy v. Shott