¶1concurring in the result only.
¶2I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the calculation of aggravating factors in a defendant’s sentence is relevant to the jury’s understanding of the presence of an aggravating factor. I would rule that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the State to present to the jury any information relating to the effect of an aggravating factor on defendant’s sentence. However, because overwhelming evidence in support of the aggravating factor exists, I believe the trial court’s error was harmless, and I concur in the majority’s result only.
¶3In accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), thGeneral Assembly enacted N.C.G.S. § 15A-1340.16(al) in 2005, which provides that absent an admission from the defendant, “only a jury *544may determine if an aggravating factor is present in an offense.” This is the trial jury’s sole role under section 15A-1340.16 in a noncapital case. This responsibility is accomplished through a factual evaluation of the evidence presented at the guilt-innocence phase of the trial, unless the court determines that a separate sentencing proceeding is required. N.C.G.S. § 15A-1340.16(al) (2007). Section 15A-1340.16 further provides that after a jury finds an aggravating factor, it is the trial court’s responsibility to determine the defendant’s sentence. See also State v. Ahearn, 307 N.C. 584, 597, 300 S.E.2d 689, 697 (1983) (stating that a trial judge has “ ‘discretion to increase or reduce sentences from the presumptive term upon findings of aggravating or mitigating factors, the weighing of which is a matter within [his] sound discretion” (quoting with approval State v. Davis, 58 N.C. App. 330, 333, 293 S.E.2d 658, 661, disc. rev. denied, 306 N.C. 745, 295 S.E.2d 482 (1982) (alteration in original))).
¶4In the case sub judice, the State’s closing argument was an attempt to circumvent the sentencing process set forth in section 15A-1340.16. By discussing the merger doctrine and displaying the presumptive minimum and maximum ranges of possible sentences, the State was enticing the jury to contemplate the duration of defendant’s imprisonment. This is wholly improper under the framework of section 15A-1340.16.
¶5Counsel should be given wide latitude when arguing before the jury. See State v. Price, 326 N.C. 56, 83, 388 S.E.2d 84, 99, sentence vacated on other grounds, 498 U.S. 802 (1990) cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1124 (1995) (“[C]ounsel’s argument should not be impaired without good reason. . . .”). However, if the arguments counsel advances are irrelevant, they should be limited by the trial court. Id. at 83-84, 388 S.E.2d at 99-100 (stating that a “good reason” to limit the scope of counsel’s closing argument is irrelevance (citing, inter alia, Watson v. White, 309 N.C. 498, 507, 308 S.E.2d 268, 274 (1983))). The jury was charged with answering one question: Did the evidence presented support the finding of the aggravating factor? This is purely a factual question, and much like in the guilt-innocence phase of the trial, the jury is asked to evaluate whether the State presented sufficient evidence to prove its case. This Court has ruled that in the guilt-innocence phase, “[t]he amount of punishment which a verdict of guilty will empower the judge to impose is totally irrelevant to the issue of a defendant’s guilt. It is, therefore, no concern of the jurors’.” State v. Rhodes, 275 N.C. 584, 588, 169 S.E.2d 846, 848 (1969) (citations omitted). The same logic applies here. The jury is being asked solely *545whether the aggravator is present. Information regarding the effect of the aggravating factor on the trial court’s ultimate sentencing decision is irrelevant to this determination.
¶6Therefore, I cannot conclude with the majority that “a jury’s understanding that its determination of the existence of any aggravating factors may have an effect on the sentence imposed is relevant to its role in a sentencing proceeding.” Furthermore, I disagree that N.C.G.S. § 7A-97 entitles parties to “explain to a jury the reasons why it is being asked to consider aggravating factors and . . . discuss and illustrate the general effect that finding such factors may have, such as the fact that a finding of an aggravating factor may allow the court to impose a more severe sentence.” Under section 7A-97, “[i]n jury trials the whole case as well of law as of fact may be argued to the jury.” N.C.G.S. § 7A-97 (2007). However, even under section 7A-97, counsel may not argue “principles of law not relevant to the case.” See State v. Monk, 286 N.C. 509, 515, 212 S.E.2d 125, 131 (1975) (citations omitted); see also State v. McMorris, 290 N.C. 286, 287, 225 S.E.2d 553, 554 (1976) (stating that the parties must argue “the law applicable to the facts of the case” and that “[t]he whole corpus juris is not fair game”). As explained above, the effect of an aggravating factor on a defendant’s sentence is simply not relevant to the jury’s determination of the existence of the factor. I would hold that it is error in any case for a trial court to allow either party to explain the effect an aggravating factor could have on a defendant’s sentence.
¶7While I disagree that the effect of an aggravating factor is ever relevant to a jury’s determination of the presence of an aggravating factor, I agree with the majority’s ultimate result finding that there was overwhelming evidence to support the existence of the aggravating factor. From the evidence presented in the guilt-innocence phase of the trial, it is clear that defendant knowingly operated his vehicle at a dangerously high rate of speed while he was intoxicated. Any reasonable jury would have made such a determination, even without the State’s inappropriate closing argument. Therefore, defendant was not prejudiced by the error of the trial court. I therefore concur in the majority’s result only.