Williams v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

55 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 55 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Section 5-4-104(a) can be viewed as referring only to the initial sentence imposed based on the crime for which the defendant was convicted, and § 16-90-120(a) — (b) can be read as referring only to a sentence enhancement that may be added to the initial sentence. Looking at the clear language of § 16 — 90—120(a)—(b), we observe that the legislature intended the statute to serve as an enhancement of the original sentence for the convicted crime, as the statute itself says that the sentence enhancement is an “additional period of confinement.” Ark.Code Ann. § 16-90-120(a) (emphasis added). We further note that when § 5-4-104(a) was enacted in 1975, the legislature did not choose to repeal or overrule § 16-90-120(a)-(b). This is important, since in Johnson v. State, supra, we have noted that when presented with the challenge of construing criminal statutes that were enacted at different times, the court presumes “that when the general assembly passed the later act, it was well aware of the prior act.” 331 Ark. [421,] at 425, 961 S.W.2d [764,] at 766 [ (1998) ] (holding that the Arkansas Criminal Code and the gambling-house statute can be read in harmony where one defines the term of imprisonment and the other allows the court to impose suspension or probation). We hold that § 5-4-104(a) and § 16-90-120(a)-(b) can be read harmoniously to mean that § 16-90-120(a)-(b) is only a sentence enhancement, while the Arkansas Criminal Code provides the minimum sentences to be imposed for ”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Polivka v. State

2. “The crux of Williams’s argument is that there is a conflict between § 5-4-104(a) and § 16-90-120(a-b). In this case, these two statutory provisions can be read in a harmonious manner. Section 5-4-104(a) can be viewed as referring only to the initial sentence imposed based on the crime for which the defendant was convicted, and § 16-90-120(a-b) can be read as referring only to a sentence enhancement that may be added to the initial sentence. [¡Looking at the clear language of § 16-90-120(a-b), we observe that the legislature intended the statute to serve as an enhancement of the original sentence for the convicted crime, as the statute itself says that the sentence enhancement is an “additional period of confinement.” Ark.Code Ann. § 16-90-120(a) (emphasis added). We further note that when § 5-4-104(a) was enacted in 1975, the legislature did not choose to repeal or overrule § 16-90-120(a-b). This is important, since in Johnson v. State, supra, we have noted that when presented with the challenge of construing criminal statutes that were enacted at different times, the court presumes “that when the general assembly passed the later act, it was well aware of the prior act.” 331 Ark. [421] at 425, 961 S.W.2d [764] at 766 [(1998)] (holding that the Arkansas Criminal Code and the gambling-house statute can be read in harmony where one defines the term of imprisonment and the other allows the court to impose suspension or probation). We hold that § 5-4-104(a) and § 16-90-120(a-b) c”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Neely v. State

3. “The basic rule of statutory construction, to which all other interpretive guides must yield, is to give effect to the intent of the legislature. Thomas v. State, 315 Ark. 79 , 864 S.W.2d 835 (1993); Mountain Home Sch. Dist. v. TM.J. Builders, Inc., 313 Ark. 661 , 858 S.W.2d 74 (1993). In interpreting a penal statute, “[i]t is well settled that penal statutes are strictly construed with all doubts resolved in favor of the defendant, and nothing is taken as intended which is not clearly expressed.” Hales v. State, 299 Ark. 93, 94 , 771 S.W.2d 285, 286 (1989). However, even a penal statute must not be construed so strictly as to defeat the obvious intent of the legislature. Russell v. State, 295 Ark. 619 , 751 S.W.2d 334 (1988). In this regard, we will not construe penal statutes so strictly as to reach absurd consequences which are clearly contrary to legislative intent. Cox v. State, 313 Ark. 184 , 853 S.W.2d 266 (1993); Williams v. State, 292 Ark. 616 , 732 S.W.2d 135 (1987); Ashing v. State, 288 Ark. 75 , 702 S.W.2d 20 (1986).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 2010 Ark. App. 643 - Newman v. State