¶1specially concurring:
¶2While I wholeheartedly agree with the majority’s resolution of the issue presented in this appeal, I write separately to emphasize that such an analysis has applicability only in the context of Miranda violations. Lest there be any confusion, the question of whether an individual is an agent of the police is not the same as whether an individual is a State actor. In this case, as the majority sets forth, the former question is relevant. More often, the determination of whether an individual is a State actor controls. See Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 295, 148 L. Ed. 2d 807, 816, 121 S. Ct. 924, 930 (2001) (“Our cases try to plot a line between state action subject to Fourteenth Amendment scrutiny and private conduct (however exceptionable) that is not”); see also Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 76, 149 L. Ed. 2d 205, 215, 121 S. Ct. 1281, 1287 (2001) (“Because MUSC is a state hospital, the members of its staff are government actors, subject to the strictures of the Fourth Amendment”). This is true even in the context of a public school. In New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 336-37, 83 L. Ed. 2d 720, 731, 105 S. Ct. 733, 740 (1985), the Supreme Court, while recognizing the particular characteristics of a school environment, held that, “[i]n carrying out searches and other disciplinary functions pursuant to such policies, school officials act as representatives of the State, not merely as surrogates for the parents, and they cannot claim the parents’ immunity from the strictures of the Fourth Amendment.” The Court came to this holding despite the fact that law enforcement personnel were not involved in the search at issue. Hence, the law as applied in this case is limited to alleged Miranda violations by school personnel. It does not exempt school officials generally from observing the requirements of the constitution, and it specifically has no application in fourth amendment cases.