Smith v. Smith’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

27 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 28 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “in all actions for the recovery of alimony, maintenance or support in which . . . a contempt of court citation has been made by the court against either party. . . .”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Grissett v. Grissett · 375 So. 2d 797 - Scott v. Scott

2. ““We think these arguments are without merit and that the trial court correctly found that the -payments are a part of the property settlement. The husband by his argument seeks to take improper advantage of the fact that he was originally permitted to satisfy his obligations under the property settlement with monthly installments rather than being required to make an immediate cash settlement. “A court of equity in a divorce case has power to use any reasonable means to effect a just property settlement and adjust the equities between the parties. Prosch v. Prosch, 47 Ala.App. 33 , 249 So.2d 865 , cert. den. 287 Ala. 740 , 249 So.2d 860 and 287 Ala. 740 , 249 So.2d 861 (1971), and cases cited therein. The agreement incorporated into the divorce [judgment] in the ease at bar specifically provided that the mortgage payments were to be in addition to alimony payments. The wife was to receive sole and exclusive title to the ... residence, and in exchange she was to relinquish her interest in other jointly held property. The [judgment] of October 12, 1976 changed neither the amount due nor the liability of the husband for the $114 per month payments. Under these circumstances we do not' think that a mere change of payee from the mortgage company to the wife transformed these payments into ‘alimony,’ nor do we think that the satisfaction of the mortgage debt by the wife extinguished the husband’s obligation to continue the payments required by the [judgment].””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Reneman v. Reneman

3. ““that since the language of the separation agreement required only that he make the payments ‘until said mortgage is fully satisfied,’ a continuation of these payments after the mortgage has'been satisfied (by the wife in 1976 [when she sold the house]) constitutes the kind of support and maintenance properly classified as ‘alimony”; and upon the wife’s remarriage his obligation to pay alimony should cease. While agreeing it is the law in Alabama that provisions in a divorce [judgment] for a property settlement, unlike those for alimony, are not . modifiable, the husband insists that these payments must be viewed as ‘alimony1 because the court’s [judgment] of October 12, 1976, ‘modified’ the provisions for the payments by requiring that they be made to the wife rather than to the mortgage company.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Reneman v. Reneman