Conklin v. Schofield’s Empirical Analysis
366 F.3d 1191 · 2004
Citation profile
24 federal appellate · 3 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 62 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently July 2017 · most notably United States v. Brown (2006), United States v. Williams (2008)
24 federal appellate · 3 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)
Relies on Strickland v. Washington · Jackson v. Virginia · Williams v. Taylor · Powell v. State of Alabama Patterson · Bonner v. City of Prichard
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 62 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“Generally, to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient, and counsel’s performance prejudiced the defense. However, prejudice need not be shown in certain limited situations. [United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659-60 , 104 S.Ct. 2039 , 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984) ] notes four situations where courts have found per se ineffectiveness: (1) where there has been a “complete denial of counsel;” (2) where the accused is denied the presence of counsel at “a critical stage” such as arraignment; (3) “[when] counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing;” and (4) where circumstances are so prejudiced against the defendant that competent counsel could not render effective assistance.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“Assuming, arguendo, that Ake extends to non-psychiatric experts, then we must determine (1) whether [Petitioner] made a timely request to the trial court for the provision of expert assistance; (2) whether it was “reasonable” for the trial court to deny [Petitioner’s] request; and (3) whether the denial rendered [Petitioner’s] trial fundamentally unfair.... With respect to the third Moore [v. Kemp, 809 F.2d 702, 712 (11th Cir.1987)(eu banc) ] requirement, we ask whether the Ake error “had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.””
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“In determining the reasonableness of the trial court’s refusal to provide independent expert assistance, we consider only the facts available to the trial judge when he made a ruling on the particular motion.... The reasonableness of a judge’s denial “necessarily turns on the sufficiency of the petitioner’s explanation as to why he needed an expert.” ... Thus, we ask whether the trial judge should “have concluded that unless he granted his request Petitioner would likely be denied an adequate opportunity fairly to confront the State’s case and to present his defense.””
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.