Crosby v. State’s Empirical Analysis
2001
Citation profile
56 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 58 later decisions (2 by the Supreme Court) — most recently March 2022 · most notably Khalifa v. State (2004), Derr v. State (2013)
56 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Miranda v. State of Arizona Vignera · Doyle v. Ohio · Malloy v. Hogan · Michigan v. Mosley · Fare v. Michael C.
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 58 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“The protections bestowed upon citizens by the privilege against self-incrimination do not disappear once the accused initially waives his or her rights. An accused may invoke his or her rights at any time during questioning, or simply refuse to answer any question asked, and this silence cannot be used against him or her.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage“through reliance on State evidentiary law, the Court of Special Appeals has provided greater protection for a defendant’s silence than the Supreme Court by asserting that an accused’s post-arrest, pre-Miranda warning, silence is inadmissible for impeachment because the probative value, if any, of such evidence, is clearly outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice. See Grier v. State, 351 Md. 241 , 718 A.2d 211, 220 (1998)(noting that while this Court has not had occasion to address the issue of whether post-arrest, pre-Miranda warning, silence is admissible for impeachment purposes, the Court of Special Appeals has reviewed this issue and held that post-arrest, pre-Miranda warning silence is too ambiguous to be admissible, even as impeachment evidence)(e.g. Key-El v. State, 349 Md. 811, 818 , 709 A.2d 1305, 1308 (1998)(ex-plaining that Maryland courts have distinguished between post-arrest and pre-arrest silence); Wills v. State, 82 Md.App. 669, 674 , 573 A.2d 80, 83 (1990), finding error when evidence of a defendant’s post-arrest, pr e-Miranda silence was admitted for impeachment purposes because the potential for prejudice outweighed the probative value). The Supreme Court concluded that the use of a defendant’s post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence to impeach did not offend federal due process guarantees; however, the Court commented that states are free to determine, as a matter of state constitutional law or rules of evidence, whether to preclude the admission of this ”
1 later decision quote this exact passage“[Ejvidence of an accused’s post-arrest, pre-Miranda warning, silence for impeachment is inadmissible because the probative value, if any, of such evidence, is clearly outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice.... In view of the potential for unfair prejudice to the defendant and the likelihood that an arrestee’s silence is motivated by a reason other than consciousness of guilt, we hold that it is error for the court to admit evidence of a criminal defendant’s post-arrest, pre-Miranda warning, silence for impeachment purposes.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.