¶1dissenting.
¶2Obviously, the delay here was not attributable to the prosecution. The office of the State’s Attorney twice requested in writing that a trial date be set in this case, as well as others, on April 14, 1983, and November 14, 1983. And, the defendant did not demand a speedy trial; State v. Wunderlich, 338 N.W.2d 658 (N.D.1983).
¶3While a trial court “can dismiss whenever there has been unnecessary delay without being required to decide whether the unnecessary delay was of such a nature as to deprive the defendant of a constitutional right,” (Explanatory Note, Rule 48, Dismissal, North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure; see State v. Erickson, 241 N.W.2d 854, 859 (N.D.1976)) it is not clear to me that it can do so when the reasons for the delay in scheduling trial are not apparent from the record, as in this case.
¶4Therefore, I would reverse. I dissent.