Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist
← 366 Pa. Super. 78 - Commonwealth v. Zeitlen

366 Pa. Super. 78 - Commonwealth v. Zeitlen’s Empirical Analysis

1987

Citation profile

26
cited by 26 later decisions
1
states following
December 2013
most recently cited

26 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 26 later decisions — most recently December 2013 · most notably 372 Pa. Super. 145 - Commonwealth v. Felix (1988), 381 Pa. Super. 120 - Commonwealth v. Osteen (1989)

26 state decisions

1601987199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Morrissey v. Brewer · Evitts v. Lucey · Commonwealth v. Tuladziecki · Ex parte Robinson · 299 Pa. Super. 64 - Commonwealth v. Sanford

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 26 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “. . . this Court has generally exercised great forbearance in exercising its discretionary powers under Pa.R.A.P. 902 and Pa.R.A.P. 2101 to quash briefs and dismiss appeals. Only on a few occasions, in extreme cases, and with great reluctance has this Court ordered criminal appeals quashed because of counsel's failure to comply with rules of appellate procedure. In Commonwealth v. Taylor, 306 Pa.Super. 1 , 451 A.2d 1360 (1982), we explained: The Court will not meticulously examine each brief which comes before us with the express intent of suppressing those which contain minor defects or omissions which are correctable through less drastic means. However, where gross deviations from the appellate rules, which substantially impair our ability to exercise the power of review, are present, we will not hesitate to suppress the party's brief and quash the appeal. 451 A.2d at 1361 . (Emphasis added). Clearly, the omission in the instant case is "correctable through less drastic means." Furthermore, it is important to note that the question of whether to quash, dismiss, or deny allowance of a criminal appeal based upon counsel's procedural errors involves constitutional questions which may not lightly be dismissed, and policy considerations which cannot be ignored. When this Court exercises its discretionary authority to quash, dismiss, or deny allowance of appeal based upon procedural defects, it places the entire burden of counsel's errors upon the appellant rather than the offend”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
  2. “The Court will not meticulously examine each brief which comes before us with the express intent of suppressing those which contain minor defects or omissions which are correctable through less drastic means. However, where gross deviations from the appellate rules, which substantially impair our ability to exercise the power of review, are present, we will not hesitate to suppress the party's brief and quash the appeal.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
  3. “[TJhere appears to be some question as to whether the requirement of the separate, concise statement of reasons for allowance of appeal under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b) required by Pa.R.Crim.P. 2119(f) is jurisdictional or procedural in nature. Compare Commonwealth v. Hawthorne, supra [ 364 Pa.Super. 125 , 527 A.2d 559 (1987)] and Commonwealth v. Lapcevich, supra [ 367 Pa.Super. 151 , 527 A.2d 572 (1987) ] (Del Sole, J., concurring). The distinction, however, may be more one of semantics rather than of substance. Because timely notice of appeal acts as an initial petition for allowance of appeal in such cases, at least provisional jurisdiction is thereby acquired. See Pa.R.A.P. 902 & Note. However, as Commonwealth v. Hawthorne, supra, demonstrates, the failure to comply with Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f), has a substantive effect in that without at least “substantial compliance” with Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) (see Commonwealth v. Lapcevich, supra; Commonwealth v. Bogden, supra [ 364 Pa.Super. 300 , 528 A.2d 168 (1987) ]), the appellant/petitioner will be unable to meet his burden to establish the appearance of a substantial question regarding the appropriateness of the sentence imposed. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b). While an opponent can certainly waive a procedural defect such as this, this Court is clearly not at liberty to ignore the defect and proceed to review of the merits of the claim. This Court stated in Commonwealth v. Hawthorne, supra: In light of the unequivocal terms in which the Supreme ”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.