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366 So. 2d 171

Mason v. State

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Decided January 16, 1979

District Court of Appeal of Florida · decided 1979-01-16

Cited by 4 later decisions — most recently May 1989

4 state decisions

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“[e]ntertain submissions and evidence by the parties which are relevant to the sentence,”

quoted by 2 later decisions, including 482 So. 2d 367 - Gitman v. State, 542 So. 2d 1061 - Nunez v. State

“While it is undisputed that this rule requires a court, before sentencing, to afford a defendant the opportunity to present matters in mitigation of sentence, the court is not compelled under the rules to grant defendant a continuance prior to sentencing upon his motion therefor. The general rule is that the granting or denial of a motion for continuance is within the discretion of the trial court, and the court's action thereto will be reversed only upon a showing of a palpable abuse of discretion... . Defendant was given an opportunity to submit evidence in mitigation of sentence, and we find the trial court fully complied with the requirements of Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.720.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including 435 So. 2d 258 - Miller v. State

Relies on First Commerce Realty Investors v. Peninsular Title Ins. Co. · Jones v. State · Culbertson v. State

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1979-01-16

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

PER CURIAM.

¶1Appellant was convicted of simple battery after a jury trial. She was adjudicated guilty and given the maximum sentence of one year in jail. We affirm the conviction but remand the cause for a sentencing hearing as required by Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.720.

¶2The requirement of a sentencing hearing is mandatory-under the rule and may not be omitted at the discretion of the trial court. Mask v. State, 289 So.2d 385 (Fla.1973); Trudeau v. State, 348 So.2d 66 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977), certiorari denied, 355 So.2d 517 (Fla.1978); Culbertson v. State, 306 So.2d 142 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975). Nor can the mandatory nature of the rule be satisfied by giving the appellant the opportunity to submit evidence in mitigation of her sentence at a subsequent hearing on her motion to mitigate. Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.720(b) requires that the sentencing court shall: “Entertain submissions and evidence by the parties which are relevant to the sentence[.]” Clearly, it would defeat the whole purpose of the rule to deny the defendant the opportunity to present evidence relevant to the sentence prior to the imposition of that sentence.

¶3Cheatham v. State, 346 So.2d 1218 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977) does not dictate a contrary result. There, we held that the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion for a continuance prior to sentencing was not an abuse of discretion. The trial court in Cheathamfully complied with the requirements of Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.720. In this case, the trial court expressly denied the appellant’s motion for a sentencing hearing. This denial was error.

¶4This case is remanded for resentencing after first affording the appellant an opportunity to offer matters in mitigation as mandated by the Rules of Criminal Procedure. In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

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