Pinder v. State’s Empirical Analysis
1978
Citation profile
8 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 8 later decisions — most recently July 1999
8 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on North Carolina v. Pearce · Benton v. Maryland · Brown v. Ohio · United States v. Wilson · Ex parte Lange
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 8 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“The only significant difference between the instant case and Harris v. Oklahoma is that in Harris the defendant was convicted of felony-murder in one trial and robbery in another, whereas here defendant was convicted of felony-murder and the underlying felonies all in one trial. In our opinion this difference does not distinguish the instant case from Harris . Over one hundred years ago the Supreme Court announced in Ex Parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163, 173 , 21 L.Ed. 872, 878 (1874): For of what avail is the constitutional protection against more than one trial if there can be any number of sentences pronounced on the same verdict? Why is it that, having once been tried and found guilty, he can never be tried again for that offense? Manifestly it is not the danger or jeopardy of being a second time found guilty. It is the punishment that would legally follow the second conviction which is the real danger guarded against by the Constitution. But if, after judgment has been rendered on the conviction, and the sentence of that judgment executed on the criminal, he can be again sentenced on that conviction to another and different punishment, or to endure the same punishment a second time, is the constitutional restriction of any value? Is not its intent and its spirit in such a case as much violated as if a new trial had been had and, on a second conviction, a second punishment inflicted? The argument seems to us irresistible, and we do not doubt that the Constitution was designed as ”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“CAN A DEFENDANT BE CONVICTED AND PUNISHED FOR BOTH FIRST-DEGREE MURDER AND AN UNDERLYING FELONY ENUMERATED IN § 782.04(1) WHERE: (A) THE DEFENDANT IS CHARGED WITH PREMEDITATED MURDER AND ONE OR MORE OF THE FELONIES ENUMERATED IN § 782.04(1); AND (B) THE EVIDENCE TO SUSTAIN THE MURDER CONVICTION IS FURNISHED SOLELY BY PROOF THAT THE KILLING OCCURRED AS A RESULT OF COMMISSION OF ONE OF THE SAID FELONIES?”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.