Bigelow v. Williams’s Empirical Analysis
367 F.3d 562 · 2004
Citation profile
16 federal appellate ·
Relationships
Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)
Relies on Strickland v. Washington · Wiggins v. Smith, Warden · Schlup v. Delo · Lockhart v. Fretwell · George Lindstadt v. John P. Keane, Superintendent
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 35 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“[Defendant] must demonstrate a “reasonable probability” that the result of his trial would have been different but for [his lawyer’s] mistakes. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 . A “reasonable probability” is a probability “sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome,” id., but something less than a showing that the outcome more likely than not would have been different, id. at 693 , 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 .”
4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim— (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“In one sense, it is easier to sympathize with Rost than with Bigelow when it comes to this claim. Bigelow lived an itinerant life in Columbus; he did not remember exactly where he was in Columbus on the day of the crime; he did not fully communicate all possible leads to Rost and apparently did not inform him about his own letter-writing investigation efforts from prison; and Rost in fact did pursue many leads, none of which bore fruit. Until four days before Bigelow’s trial, it is indeed difficult to second-guess Rost’s efforts, frustrating as they were, to advance his client’s defense. On the fourth day before the commencement of the criminal trial, however, Vernon Greenlee, an employee of Orkin Pest Control, called Rost and told him that he could place Bigelow in Columbus on the day of the crime. (Greenlee’s call was prompted by a letter that Bigelow had written to Orkin from prison.) Realizing the significance of this testimony, Rost subpoenaed Greenlee and one other Orkin employee to testify at the trial. The testimony was helpful because Greenlee identified Bigelow in court as the man he saw at the home of Gary [Chasin] in Columbus on June 17th, the day of the assault, but the testimony was vulnerable to impeachment because Greenlee worked at the house at issue on two consecutive days. In convicting Bigelow, the jury apparently was swayed by the two primary pieces of evidence submitted by the State-the testimony of the victim who was able to pick Bigelow out of a lineup”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.