Wilson v. Weiss’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

12 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 12 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “We have "differentiated that `special' legislation arbitrarily separates some person, place, or thing, while `local' legislation arbitrarily applies to one geographic division of the state to the exclusion of the rest of the state." McCutchen v. Huckabee, 328 Ark. 202, 208 , 943 S.W.2d 225, 227 (citing Fayetteville Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Arkansas State Bd. of Educ., 313 Ark. 1 , 852 S.W.2d 122 (1993)). With regard to a challenge under Amendment 14, this court has also said: [T]his court has repeatedly held that merely because a statute ultimately affects less than all of the state's territory does not necessarily render it local or special legislation.' Fayetteville, supra ; City of Little Rock v. Waters, 303 Ark. 363 , 797 S.W.2d 426 (1990). Instead, we have consistently held that an act of the General Assembly that applies to only a portion of this state is constitutional if the reason for limiting the act to one area is rationally related to the purposes of that act. Fayetteville, supra ; Owen, [v. Dalton], supra [ 296 Ark. 351 , 757 S.W.2d 921 (1988)] ; Board of Trustees v. City of Little Rock, 295 Ark. 585 , 750 S.W.2d 950 (1988); Streight v. Ragland, 280 Ark. 206 , 655 S.W.2d 459 (1983). Of particular interest, is Phillips v. Giddings, 278 Ark. 368 , 646 S.W.2d 1 (1983), where we clarified that although there may be a legitimate purpose for passing the act, it is the classification, or the decision to apply that act to only one area of the state, that must be rational. McC”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Gallas v. Alexander

2. “[T]his court has repeatedly held that merely because a statute ultimately affects less than all of the state’s territory does not necessarily render it local or special legislation. Fayetteville, supra; City of Little Rock v. Waters, 303 Ark. 363 , 797 S.W.2d 426 (1990). Instead, we have consistently held that an act of the General Assembly that applies to only a portion of this state is constitutional if the reason for Hmiting the act to one area is rationally related to the purposes of that act. Fayetteville, supra; Owen, supra; Board of Trustees v. City of Little Rock, 295 Ark. 585 , 750 S.W.2d 950 (1988); Streight v. Ragland, 280 Ark. 206 , 655 S.W.2d 459 (1983). Of particular interest, is Phillips v. Giddings, 278 Ark. 368 , 646 S.W2d 1 (1983), where we clarified that although there may be a legitimate purpose for passing the act, it is the classification, or the decision to apply that act to only one area of the state, that must be rational.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Wilson v. Weiss

3. “differentiated that `special' legislation arbitrarily separates some person, place, or thing, while `local' legislation arbitrarily applies to one geographic division of the state to the exclusion of the rest of the state.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Gallas v. Alexander