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← 368 F.2d 144 - United States v. Gearey

United States v. Gearey’s Empirical Analysis

368 F.2d 144 · 1966

Citation profile

197
cited by 197 later decisions
2
cited 2 times by the Supreme Court
April 1978
most recently cited

126 federal appellate · 21 district ·

Relationships

Applies 50 U.S.C. § 3806 · 50 U.S.C. § 3809 · 50 U.S.C. § 3811

Relies on United States v. Seeger · Foti v. Immigration & Naturalization Service · Braunfeld v. Gibbons · Gonzales v. United States · United States v. Nugent

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 197 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““ * * * the classification of a registrant shall not be reopened after the local board has mailed * * * an Order to Report for Induction * * * unless the local board first specifically finds there has been a change in the registrant’s status resulting from circumstances over which the registrant has no control.””
    10 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. “[T]he Local Board must first determine when an applicant’s beliefs matured. If the Board properly concludes that the claim existed before the notice was sent, the classification may not be reopened. If the Board finds, however, that the applicant’s beliefs ripened only after he received his notice, and that his beliefs qualify him for classification as a conscientious objector then a change in status would have occurred “resulting from circumstances over which the registrant had no control,” and he would be entitled to be reclassified by the Local Board. 368 F.2d at 150 . (Footnote omitted.)”
    5 later decisions quote this exact passage
  3. ““If the Board had found that Gearey’s beliefs after the induction notice were no different than before, that would have sufficed, provided the judge found a rational basis for it. Again, if the Board had said clearly that in its view Gearey never had been and was not now ‘a genuine c. o.,’ that too would have sufficed, subject to the same proviso, since there.eould not be ‘a change in the registrant’s status resulting from circumstances over which the registrant had no control’ if there, had been no change at all. The Board’s determination as to the sincerity of the claim, while ordinarily subject to an appeal with the safeguards of § 6(j), would not be in these circumstances because of the applicability of § 1625.2 to conscientious objector claims. While the Board’s finding that Gearey was not ‘a genuine c. o.’ may have been a shorthand ma.nner of expressing one or the other of the above views, it might also have meant that the Board was refusing to reopen on the ground that Gearey had not advanced his claim before the mailing of the induction notice, even though the claim had not matured until later. “We see no reason, however, why the Board’s failure to speak with pristine clarity should require dismissal of this indictment. A remand should enable the judge to ascertain from the Local Board precisely what it meant. * * * If it meant either that Gearey never was ‘a genuine c. o.’ or that whatever his beliefs were on the subject, they had matured before the induction notice ”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.