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← 368 F.3d 269 - Parilla v. IAP Worldwide Services VI, Inc.

Parilla v. IAP Worldwide Services VI, Inc.’s Empirical Analysis

368 F.3d 269 · 2004

Citation profile

55
cited by 55 later decisions
4
states following
April 2024
most recently cited

19 federal appellate · 6 district · 6 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 55 later decisions — most recently April 2024 · most notably Berckeley Investment Group, Ltd. v. Colkitt (2006), Lloyd v. Hovensa, LLC (2004)

19 federal appellate · 6 district · 6 state decisions

300200420102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 1331 · 28 U.S.C. § 1367 · 42 U.S.C. § 2000E (§ 701 of the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964) · 42 U.S.C. § 2000E (§ 706 of the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964) · 48 U.S.C. § 1612 · 9 U.S.C. § 1 (Federal Arbitration Act) · 9 U.S.C. § 10 (Federal Arbitration Act) · 9 U.S.C. § 16 (Federal Arbitration Act)

Relies on Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp. · Mitsubishi Motors Corporation v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc · Christiansburg Garment Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission · Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. · Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 55 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “Essentially, we have held that an arbitration provision that makes the arbitral forum prohibitively expensive for a weaker party is unconscionable. See Alexander, 341 F.3d at 269-70. With respect to an employee who is unable to pay the costs of arbitration, we see little difference between a 100% probability that the employee will have to pay half the arbitrator’s fees and expenses on the one hand, and an indeterminate (but less than 100%) probability that the employ ee would have to pay all of the arbitrator’s fees and expenses on the other. In either case, the employee must consider whether arbitration will be so prohibitively expensive for her that she cannot take advantage of the arbitral forum. Simply the prospect that the employee may have to pay the entire amount of the arbitrator’s fees and expenses may serve to chill her willingness to bring a claim. Moreover, we see no reason to suspect that providing the arbitrator with some discretion to direct whether such fees will ultimately be incurred would have a determinative effect on the employee’s calculus in deciding whether to seek arbitration. We therefore conclude that, as long as Parilla carries her burden to show an inability to pay the anticipated arbitral costs, the “loser pays” provision is just as unreasonably favorable to Appellants as would be a “fee splitting” provision. Accordingly, Parilla must be allowed limited discovery on remand in order to provide her with the means to show her inability to pay the an”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “[Section] 208 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides the rule of decision here. That section provides, in relevant part, that “[i]f a contract or term thereof is unconscionable at the time the contract is made a court may refuse to enforce the contract.” Restatement § 208 (emphasis added). Accordingly, we must determine unconscionability as of the time the contract was formed, and an after-the-fact offer to waive certain contract provisions can have no effect on our analysis.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “If a contract or term thereof is unconscionable at the time the contract is made a court may refuse to enforce the contract, or may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable term, or may so limit the application of any unconscionable term as to avoid any unconscionable result.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.