368 Pa. Super. 327 - Commonwealth v. Pearsall’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

63 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 63 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “To qualify as an expert witness, a witness need only have a “reasonable pretension to specialized knowledge,” on a subject for which expert testimony is admissible. Commonwealth v. Washington, 235 Pa.Super. 339 , 340 A.2d 896 (1975). An expert’s pretension to specialized knowledge may be based upon practical, occupational, or other experiential training; the expert need not have gained expertise through academic training. Commonwealth v. Ellis, 354 Pa.Super. 11 , 510 A.2d 1253 (1986); Commonwealth v. Daniels, 280 Pa.Super. 278 , 421 A.2d 721 (1980). The determination of whether a witness is qualified to offer an expert opinion on a particular subject is a matter addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and its discretion will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Samuels, 354 Pa.Super. 128 , 511 A.2d 221 (1986); Commonwealth v. Ellis, supra; Commonwealth v. Bulling, 331 Pa.Super. 84 , 480 A.2d 254 (1984).”

   5 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 437 Pa. Super. 491 - Commonwealth v. Kilgore · 425 Pa. Super. 24 - Commonwealth v. Bowser

2. “... In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must view the evidence presented and all reasonable inferences taken therefrom in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, as verdict winner. The test is whether the evidence, thus viewed, is sufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The credibility of witnesses and the weight to be accorded the evidence produced are matters within the province of the trier of fact; the fact finder is free to believe all, some, or none of the evidence. A motion for new trial on grounds that the verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence concedes that there is sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict but contends, nevertheless, that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. Whether a new trial should be granted on grounds that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge, and his decision will not be reversed on appeal unless there has been an abuse of discretion. The test is not whether the court would have decided the case in the same way but whether the verdict is so contrary to the evidence as to make the award of a new trial imperative so that right may be given another opportunity to prevail.”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 382 Pa. Super. 438 - Commonwealth v. Lyons · 373 Pa. Super. 116 - Commonwealth v. Ogin

3. “[Tjhere is a fundamental distinction between expert testimony which supports the credibility of a witness inferentially by establishing that a witness’ testimony is consistent with the acts and responses evidenced in known child abuse cases, and expert testimony which presumes to pass directly upon the veracity of a particular witness,”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Commonwealth v. Dunkle · 376 Pa. Super. 390 - Commonwealth v. Thek