United States v. Drum’s Empirical Analysis
1962
Citation profile
103 federal appellate · 16 district · 20 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 258 later decisions (22 by the Supreme Court) — most recently September 2007 · most notably Bowman Transportation, Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc. (1975), Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers of America, Local Union No. 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. (1971)
103 federal appellate · 16 district · 20 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 28 U.S.C. § 1253 · 28 U.S.C. § 1336 · 28 U.S.C. § 2322 · 28 U.S.C. § 2323 · 29 U.S.C. § 158 (§ 8 of the National Labor Relations Act) · 49 U.S.C. § 301 · 49 U.S.C. § 303 · 49 U.S.C. § 304
Relies on National Labor Relations Board v. Hearst Publications, Inc. · Rochester Telephone Corporation v. United States · Gray v. Powell · Local 24, International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Oliver · United States v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp.
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 258 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“From the outset the Commission has correctly interpreted them [the definitional sections of the Act] as importing that a purported private carrier who hires the instrumentalities of transportation from another must — if he is not to utilize a licensed carrier —assume in significant measure the characteristic burdens of the transportation business. The problem is one • • of determining — by reference to the clear but broad remedial purpose of a regulatory statute committed to agency administration — the applicability to a narrow fact situation of imprecise definitional language which delineates the coverage of the measure.”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority““Except as otherwise provided in this section and in section 310a of this title, no person shall engage in the business of a contract carrier by motor vehicle in interstate or foreign commerce on any public highway or within any reservation under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States unless there is in force with respect to such carrier a permit issued by the Commission, authorizing such person to engage in such business: Provided, That, subject to section 310 of this title, if any such carrier or a predecessor in interest was in bona fide operation as a contract carrier by motor vehicle on July 1, 1935, over the route or routes or within the territory for which application is made and has so operated since that time, or, if engaged in furnishing seasonal service, only, was in bona fide operation on July 1, 1935, during the season ordinarily covered by its operations, except in either instance as to interruptions of service over which the applicant or its predecessor in interest had no control, the Commission shall issue such permit, without further proceedings, if application for such permit was made to the Commission as provided in subsection (b) of this section and within one hundred and twenty days after October 1, 1935, and if such carrier was registered on July 1, 1935, under any code of fair competition requiring registration, the fact of registration shall be evidence of bona fide operation to be considered in connection with the issuance of such permit. Oth”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent““It is evident that the Commission here refused to allow Oklahoma [Furniture Manufacturing Company] the status of a private carrier because of its belief that financial risks are a significant burden of transportation, and its belief that such risks had been shifted by Oklahoma to the owner-operators to an extent which rendered the sanctioning of the operation as private carriage a departure from the statutory design. We think that such conclusions were well within the range of the responsibility Congress assigned to the Commission. The District Court explicitly recognized the propriety of the Commission’s inquiring into the substance of the arrangements. Yet the court’s conclusion that ‘what is involved here is private carriage on the part of the Company, rather than transportation for-hire by the owner-operators,’ 193 F.Supp., at 281 , rests on no articulated premise other than that Oklahoma did have control. If the court intended to hold that the Commission is confined to the ‘control’ test, we think it clearly in error in view of the statutory objectives which we have set forth above. If, on the other hand, the court meant to substitute its judgment for the Commission’s on the question of substance, we think that, on this record, it indulged in an unwarranted in cursion into the administrative domain.””
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.