Harrell v. Harder’s Empirical Analysis
1974
Citation profile
3 federal appellate · 4 district · 2 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 14 later decisions — most recently December 2002
3 federal appellate · 4 district · 2 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 42 U.S.C. § 1302 (§ 1102 of the Social Security Act of 1935) · 42 U.S.C. § 302 (§ 2 of the Social Security Act of 1935) · 42 U.S.C. § 601 (§ 401 of the Social Security Act of 1935) · 42 U.S.C. § 602 (§ 402 of the Social Security Act of 1935) · 42 U.S.C. § 604 (§ 404 of the Social Security Act of 1935)
Relies on Richardson v. Perales · Goldberg v. Kelly · King v. Smith · United States v. Swift & Co. · Thorpe v. Housing Authority of Durham
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 14 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“a special allowance granted for a specific period is terminated and the recipient has been informed in writing at the time of initiation that the allowance shall automatically terminate at the end of the specified period.”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority““It is clear beyond doubt that the Court has the power to modify its orders to adapt to changed conditions. United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 114 , 52 S.Ct. 460 , 76 L.Ed. 999 (1932). The crucial inquiry is whether conditions which existed at the time the order was entered have changed sufficiently to justify the modification. The Court of Appeals for this circuit has construed the applicable provision of Rule 60(b)(5) as follows: ‘The rule is not to be read without emphasis on the important words “no longer”; assuming that the propriety of the injunction as issued has passed beyond debate, it refers to some change in conditions that makes continued enforcement inequitable.’ Schildhaus v. Moe, 335 F.2d 529, 530 (2d Cir. 1964). Rule 60(b)(6) requires more than ‘some change in conditions that makes continued enforcement inequitable’; relief is justified only in the case of ‘extraordinary circumstances.’ Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 199 , 71 S.Ct. 209 , 95 L.Ed. 207 (1950); Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601 , 69 S.Ct. 384 , 93 L.Ed. 266 (1949).””
1 later decision quote this exact passagee.g. Class v. Norton“The pretermination procedural requirements have one function only: “to produce an initial determination of the validity of the welfare department’s grounds for discontinuance of payments in order to protect a recipient against an erroneous termination of his benefits.” Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. at 267 , 90 S.Ct. at 1020 . Thus, if dispensing with timely notice (and, perforce, discontinuing assistance before the hearing) will neither affect the likelihood of the agency’s rendering an erroneous decision nor subject the recipient to “brutal need,” the necessity for provision of such notice is eliminated. Harrel v. Harder, 369 F.Supp. at 820 .”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.