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← 369 Mass. 904 - Commonwealth v. Jackson

Commonwealth v. Jackson’s Empirical Analysis

1976

Citation profile

129
cited by 129 later decisions
13
states following
June 2019
most recently cited

4 federal appellate · 125 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 129 later decisions — most recently June 2019 · most notably Opinions of the Justices to the House of Representatives (1979), State v. Freeman (1978)

4 federal appellate · 125 state decisions — followed in 13 states

53019761980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 26 U.S.C. § 5861 (§ 201 of the Gun Control Act of 1968) · 26 U.S.C. § 5871 (§ 201 of the Gun Control Act of 1968)

Relies on Furman v. Georgia · Trop v. Dulles · Weems v. United States · Lambert v. People of the State of California · United States v. Freed

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 129 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “"[W]e cannot say that these practices have attained a constitutional status. The ability to defer the imposition of sentence, although a valuable feature in our legal system, is not necessary to the very existence of a court, and, as such, is not an inherent power beyond statutory limitation. The logic of this position is demonstrated by considering that in our tripartite system of government it is unquestionable that the Legislature has the authority to determine what conduct shall be punishable and to prescribe penalties. Sheehan, petitioner, 254 Mass. 342, 345 , 150 N.E. 231 (1926). Although it is the court's function to impose sentences upon conviction, it is for the Legislature to establish criminal sanctions and, as one of its options, it may prescribe a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment. Bel v. Chernoff, 390 F.Supp. 1256, 1259 (D.Mass. 1975). If we were to conclude that the judiciary could exercise its discretion to suspend imposition or execution of sentence despite statutory proscription, a serious question concerning the separation of powers would arise, for, taking this proposition to its logical extreme, it would mean that the judiciary impliedly possesses the power to nullify the Legislature's authority. As recognized by the Supreme Court in Ex parte United States, petitioner, supra, 242 U.S. at 42 , 37 S.Ct. at 74 , `if it be that the plain legislative command fixing a specific punishment for crime is subject to be permanently set aside by an implied judici”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
  2. “imposed upon such person shall not be reduced to less than one year, nor suspended,”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
  3. “To reach the level of cruel and unusual, the punishment must be so disproportionate to the crime that it 'shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity.'”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.