majority">Kavanagh, J.

Emory Scbian, as administrator of tbe estate of bis son, Carl Scbian, deceased, began this action under the death act against defendants Lorenz Bierlein and Milton Schian. He alleged Bierlein was guilty of negligence and Schian was guilty of gross negligence, each being a proximate cause of the death of his son. Each defendant by answer denied any neligence or gross negligence. Each denied any negligence that was a proximate cause of the accident. The case was tried in the Tuscola county circuit court without a jury. At the conclusion of plaintiff’s proofs, defendants each moved for a judgment of no cause for action.

The trial judge granted the motions. In so doing he found there was no proof on the record of gross negligence on the part of defendant Schian. As to defendant Bierlein, he found there was no proof of negligence that was a proximate cause of this accident. Judgment of no cause for action was thereupon entered.

Plaintiff is here on appeal, claiming the trial court erred in granting defendant Bierlein’s motion. No appeal is taken from the order and judgment of the trial court in the ease of defendant Schian.

The following facts relative to the accident are necessary to a discussion of the case:

On September 12, 1959, plaintiff’s 11-year-old son Carl was en route to defendant Milton Schian’s farm near Brown City, Michigan. He was a passenger in *221Milton Schian’s 1958 Dodge automobile driven by Milton Schian’s son Leo. They were proceeding south on Bradford road. Leo came to a complete stop for the stop sign at M-81. About 3/4 of a mile south of M-81 Leo drove his father’s car, with apparent great force, into the rear of southbound defendant Bierlein’s tractor.. Leo remembers nothing after stopping for the stop sign at M-81. Testimony does not disclose the exact time the accident occurred, but following the accident an ambulance driver drove back to plaintiff’s home and arrived there at approximately 5:55 a.m.

Defendant Bierlein’s tractor was equipped with 3 lights — 2 in the front, 1 in the rear — shining “mostly” downward; the lights were white or yellow. It is admitted the tractor was not equipped with a rear red taillight.

Plaintiff’s position is that the testimony, viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, presents an issue of fact as to whether defendant Bierlein was actionably negligent. The question of fact depends upon the determination of the issue of the need for Bierlein to have a red light displayed on the rear of the tractor clearly discernible 500 feet to the rear, in accordance with paragraph (a) of section 6861 and paragraph (a) of section 6842 of the Michigan vehicle *222code. Sunrise on the- day in question was 6:09 a.ni. Plaintiff contends that if the accident occurred after 5:39 a.m., the duty to have such a red light might have been statutorily imposed if atmospheric or other conditions were present making display of such red light necessary; and that if the accident occurred before 5:39 a.m., the duty to have such light was statutorily imposed, since the accident occurred more than 1/2 hour before sunrise.

While the precise moment of the accident is not disclosed, plaintiff contends the following facts establish the time: Plaintiff’s wife testified the time of departure of plaintiff’s decedent and Leo Schian from the home was 5:20 a.m. Leo Schian testified they left at 5:30 a.m., with the car headlights on. He further testified it was that time of day when lights were needed and as far as he could recall he did not turn them off prior to the accident. The point of the accident was only 1-1/4 miles south from the point of departure.

Defendant Bierlein’s tractor was proceeding south on Bradford road with 2 lights on the front and a rear light shining downwards.

Leo Schian, who was injured in the accident, was back at plaintiff’s house via ambulance at approximately 5:55 a.m. The ambulance was called by an unidentified person and came from Beese, Michigan, some 3 miles west of Bradford road. It had traveled to the scene of the accident, picked up Leo Schian and en route to the hospital stopped at plaintiff’s house to notify plaintiff of the accident at approximately 5:55 a.m.

The trial judge did not make a factual determination there was no proof of negligence on this record on the part of defendant Bierlein. He merely found there was no proof of negligence on the record that was a proximate cause of the accident. The trial court at this stage of the trial is required to consider *223motions for judgment in the same fashion as it would had there been a jury. Stolt v. Shalogian, 326 Mich 435.

The testimony and favorable inferences therefrom, viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, presents an issue of fact as to whether defendant Bierlein was negligent in failing to have a red light displayed on the rear of his tractor in accordance with the statute.

In the case of O’Grady v. Rydman, 347 Mich 606, this Court approved a finding of fact of a causal connection made by the trial court based upon the following (pp 610, 611):

“ ‘The court is also going to find the truck insofar as CLS 1954, § 257.688 (Stat Ann 1952 Rev § 9.2388), which required him to have 2 clearance lights on the front, 1 on each side, the testimony is undisputed that he did not have such lights, the court is going to find he was negligent in that regard as a matter of law, because the facts are undisputed that he did not have them, so now we come to the question of proximate cause. * * * Parking lights are small lights, possibly an inch, or an inch and a half in diameter, whereas headlights are large lights, the lights are maybe 6 or 8 inches in diameter and they have power behind them so the court feels that these headlights should have been on and these clearance lights should have been on, that would have made 4 lights on the front of this truck, and the court finds as a matter of fact that is negligence on the part of the defendant Isaacs, that it was a proximate cause, a proximate cause and concurring cause with the negligence of the driver of the defendant Rydman car, a concurring cause which caused the accident and resulting injuries. The court feels that the Rydman car driver could have seen the truck at a considerable greater distance had the lights been on, the headlights been on, headlamps as required by the law and if the clearance lights had been on, and the court is going *224to find that the plaintiff is not guilty of any contributory negligence.’ ”

The same reasoning certainly could be applied to defendant Bierlein’s failure to have a red light displayed in accordance with the terms of the applicable statute in the instant case.

The record discloses competent evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, that the negligence of defendant Bierlein in not having a red light displayed on the rear of his tractor was a proximate cause of the accident.

The trial court erred in concluding that, as a matter of law, the question of the causal connection between the statutory violation and the injury was not proven. Such question is usually one of fact for the trier or triers of the facts. 1 Cooley on Torts (4th ed), § 50, pp 120, 121; Prosser on Torts (2d ed), § 50, p 281; Spencer v. Phillips & Taylor, 219 Mich 353; Beebe v. Hannett, 224 Mich 88; Arvo v. Delta Hardware Co., 231 Mich 488; Dunn v. City of Detroit, 349 Mich 228.

We conclude, therefore, the trial court erred in entering the judgment of no cause for action.

We note that under the new Court Rules effective January 1, Í963, GCR 1963, 504.2, the foregoing practice will be changed.

The judgment of the lower court is reversed, and a new trial granted. Plaintiff shall have costs.

Black, Souris, and Otis M. Smith, JJ., concurred with Kavanagh, J.

Paragraph, (a) of section 686 of the Michigan vehicle eode (OLS 1956, § 257.686 [Stat Ann 1960 Eev § 9.2386].), reads:

“Every motor vehicle, trailer, semitrailer, pole-trailer and any other vehicle which is being drawn in a train of vehicles shall be equipped with at least 1 rear lamp mounted on the rear, which, when lighted as hereinbefore required, shall emit a red light plainly visible from a distance of 500 feet to the rear.”

Paragraph (a) of section 684 of the Michigan vehicle code (OLS 1956, § 257.684 [Stat Ann 1960 Eev § 9.2384]), reads:

“Every vehicle upon a highway within this State at any time from a half hour after sunset to a half hour before sunrise and at any other time when there is not sufficient light to render clearly discernible persons and vehicles on, the highway at a distance of 500 feet ahead shall display lighted lamps and illuminating devices as hereinafter respectively required for different classes of vehicles, subject to exceptions with respeet to parked vehicles as hereinafter stated.”

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