369 Pa. Super. 526 - Commonwealth v. Klinger’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

32 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 32 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “We agree with the conclusion reached by the lower court that a charge which would direct the jury to acquit appellant, should it conclude that appellant acted in good faith in refusing to remit sales tax monies to the Commonwealth, was not proper in the case at bar since the criminal statute in question, 72 P.S. § 7268, does not provide for such a ‘good faith’ defense. We regard the fact that 72 P.S. § 7269 does provide for a limited good faith defense in a limited civil context, coupled with the fact that the preceding criminal section presently subject to our scrutiny (Section 7268) is totally barren of such ameliorative language, are reflective of a conscious election by our legislature to limit the application of a good faith defense to civil tax litigation. Section 7268 requires that a violation of its provisions be ‘willful.’ Insofar as the lower court correctly charged the jury concerning the necessity of a willful failure to remit tax monies as grounds for appellant’s conviction, we reject appellant’s contention that the court below usurped the function of the jury by removing from its consideration the possible good faith of appellant as it may have impacted upon the willfulness and voluntariness of appellant’s behavior.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Kipps v. Commonwealth

2. “' Applying these principles to resolve appellant’s first issue, we conclude that the General Assembly intended the oil company franchise tax to apply to the sale of diesel fuel. The Legislature imposed the tax upon an oil company’s petroleum revenues, which it defined as all consideration derived from the first sale of petroleum products otherwise subject to liquid fuels taxes. Importantly, the Legislature specifically defined petroleum products as including diesel fuel used to propel motor vehicles on the public highways. 75 Pa. C. S. §9501, 6th definition. If we were to adopt appellant’s construction that the tax does not apply to sales of diesel fuel, we would virtually eliminate the Legislature’s express inclusion of certain diesel fuel within the definition of petroleum products.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Carlos R. Leffler, Inc. v. Commonwealth

3. “The specification of petroleum products ‘otherwise subject to liquid fuels taxes’ within the definition of petroleum revenue does not change our holding. As explained above, appellant con tends that the quoted phrase refers only to the tax imposed by the Liquid Fuels Tax Act, 72 P.S. §2611(a) et seq., which applies primarily to gasoline and which does not apply to diesel fuel. We do not agree, however, that the phrase ‘liquid fuels taxes’ is a specific reference to the tax imposed by the Liquid Fuels Tax Act. If the General Assembly had intended to limit the definition of petroleum revenue to petroleum products subject to taxes imposed by the Liquid Fuels Tax Act, it could have employed a specific reference to that Act.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Carlos R. Leffler, Inc. v. Commonwealth