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369 So. 2d 96

Docket No. 78-1865.

State v. Power

STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Thomas POWER, Appellee.

District Court of Appeal of Florida · decided 1979-03-23

Cited by 4 later decisions — most recently June 1984

4 state decisions

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“A motion to dismiss under (c)(4) of this rule shall be denied if the State files a traverse which with specificity denies under oath the material fact or facts alleged in the motion to dismiss. (emphasis added).”

quoted by 1 later decision, including 398 So. 2d 500 - State v. Johnson

Relies on State v. Wardlow

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1979-03-23

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and William I. Munsey, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellant.

¶2H. Michael Evans, Clearwater, for appellee.

¶3DANAHY, Judge.

¶4Appellant, the State of Florida, contends that the trial court erred in granting the motion to dismiss filed by appellee Thomas Power who was the defendant in the court below. We agree.

¶5After appellee filed his motion to dismiss an information charging him with grand theft in the second degree in violation of Section 812.014(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1977), the state filed a sworn traverse which specifically denied a material portion of the factual allegations contained in the motion. Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.190(d) states that "A motion to dismiss under paragraph (c)(4) of this rule shall be denied if the State files a traverse which denies under oath a material fact alleged in the motion to dismiss." Accordingly, the trial court should have denied appellee's motion. State v. Wardlow,356 So.2d 901 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978).[1]

¶6We reverse the trial court's order and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

¶7GRIMES, C.J., and BOARDMAN, J., concur.

NOTES

¶8[1] We also note in passing that appellee presented his factual allegations by way of deposition testimony from several witnesses. This led to inconsistencies in appellee's facts and thus made the case one which did not lend itself to disposition by a motion to dismiss since a motion to dismiss is ordinarily granted in a typical case only when all the relevant facts are clear.

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