37 Cal. 3d 784 - People v. Courts’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

3 federal appellate · 80 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 83 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “continuance request ... was only the see-ond request by [defendant] for a continuance. (The first was a request for discovery which was denied.)”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Garcia · People v. Brown

2. “The right to the effective assistance of counsel “encompasses the right to retain counsel of one’s own choosing. [Citations.]” (People v. Holland (1978) 23 Cal.3d 77, 86 , 151 Cal.Rptr. 625 , 588 P.2d 765 .) Underlying this right is the premise that “chosen representation is the preferred representation. Defendant’s confidence in his lawyer is vital to his defense. His right to decide for himself who best can conduct the case must be respected wherever feasible.” (Maxwell v. Superior Court (1982), 30 Cal.3d 606, 615 , fn. omitted, 180 Cal.Rptr. 177 , 639 P.2d 248 .) Protection of this right furthers other values important to our criminal justice system. The right to employ counsel of one’s own choosing “is based on a value additional to that insuring reliability of the guilt-determining process. Here we are concerned not only with the state’s duty to insure ‘fairness’ in the trial but also with the state’s duty to refrain from unreasonable interference With the individual’s desire to defend himself in whatever manner he deems best, using every legitimate resource at his command.” (People v. Crovedi (1966) 65 Cal.2d 199, 206 , 53 Cal.Rptr. 284 , 417 P.2d 868 .) Both this court and the United States Supreme Court have emphasized that trial courts have the responsibility to protect a financially able individual’s right to appear and defend with counsel of his own choosing. “A necessary corollary (of the right) is that a defendant must be given a reasonable opportunity to employ ”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Carman

3. “Any limitations on the right to counsel of one’s choosing are carefully circumscribed. Thus, the right “can constitutionally be forced to yield only when it will result in significant prejudice to the defendant himself or in a disruption of the orderly processes of justice unreasonable under the circumstances of the particular case.” (People v. Crovedi, supra, 65 Cal.2 at p. 208, 53 Cal.Rptr. 284 , 417 P.2d 868 , italics added: Maxwell v. Superior Court, supra, 30 Cal.3d at pp. 613-614, 180 Cal.Rptr. 177 , 639 P.2d 248 .) The right to such counsel “must be carefully weighed against other values of substantial importance, such as that seeking to ensure orderly and expeditious judicial administration, with a view toward an accommodation reasonable under the facts of the particular case.” (People v. Byoune, supra, 65 Cal.2d at p. 346 , 54 Cal.Rptr. 749 , 420 P.2d 221 .) However, “a myopic insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay can render the right to defendant with counsel an empty formality.” (Ungar v. Sarafite, supra [1964] 376 U.S. [575] at p. 589, 84 S.Ct. [841] at p. 849 [ 11 L.Ed.2d 921 ].) For this reason, trial courts should accommodate such requests — when they are linked to an assertion of the right to retained counsel — “to the fullest extent consistent with effective judicial administration.” (People v. Crovedi, supra, 65 Cal.2d at p. 209 , 53 Cal.Rptr. 284 , 417 P.2d 868 .) In deciding whether the denial of a continuance was s”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Carman