37 Cal. 4th 1249 - In Re Thomas’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

16 federal appellate · 47 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 69 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “As the referee found, and the parties do not dispute, Chaffee conducted no investigation for supporting witnesses or corroborating evidence outside Rainbow Village, despite knowing or having strong reason to suspect that both the victims and Bo came not from Rainbow Village but from the distinct Deadhead community. We conclude this omission was unreasonable. Chaffee’s apparent strategy was twofold: he wanted to cast doubt on the prosecution’s circumstantial evidence, including the apparent lack of motive, and he wanted to offer the jury the possibility of an alternate killer. Given this strategy, any evidence adding to the plausibility of the alternate-killer theory would have been critical. Did Bo exist? Did he have ties to the victims? What was the subject of the argument Cercy reported witnessing between Bo and [Mary] Gioia? Did Bo own or have access to a gun? Given the actual defense strategy, these were crucial questions. Given the knowledge that [Mary] Gioia and [Greg] Kniffin were Deadheads who had come to Berkeley for a show, and reason to suspect that Bo (if he existed) was likewise a member of this transient Deadhead community, a reasonable attorney would have made some effort to trace Bo in that community. ... [Chaffee] never asked an investigator to conduct any search in the Grateful Dead community, nor did he ask anyone more familiar with that community how he might go about tracking down a Dead-head. A reasonable attorney in 1985, charged with representing a cap”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Thomas v. Chappell

2. “At the outset, the evidence against petitioner was entirely circumstantial and not substantial. As noted supra, it included 1) petitioner’s ownership of a rifle that could have inflicted the victims’ wounds, 2) sightings of Thomas alone with the victims shortly before the killings, 3) petitioner’s conduct and statements before and after the murders, and 4) a corncob pipe recovered at the murder scene that was argued to belong to petitioner. There were no eyewitnesses to the crime, no confession, no murder weapon was found, and there was no blood or DNA tying petitioner to the crime. Courts have found cases where no physical evidence links the accused to the crime to be close ones. Moreover, each item of evidence lends itself to an explanation that is not inculpatory. Petitioner’s rifle, which was never clearly established as the murder weapon, could well have been stolen, just as he consistently told people. The fact that petitioner was seen with the victims the night of the murders does not establish that he killed them, particularly given that Bo was reportedly seen with the victims later under more suspicious circumstances. That petitioner’s corncob pipe was found near the crime scene can be explained by the fact that petitioner and the victims had been smoking marijuana from that pipe, and the plausible possibility that he did not retrieve it from them. Petitioner’s statement, “That’s Mary,” identifying [Mary] Gioia’s body when he was 45 feet away loses its significance w”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Thomas v. Chappell

3. ““Though we defer to the referee on factual and credibility matters, in other areas we give no deference to the referee’s findings. We independently review prior testimony (In re Cox, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 998, fn. 2 ), as well as all mixed questions of fact and law (In re Ross, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 201 ). Whether counsel’s performance was deficient, and whether any deficiency prejudiced the petitioner, are both mixed questions subject to independent review. (Ibid.) Ultimately, the referee’s findings are not binding on us (In re Malone, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 946; In re Ross, at p. 201; In re Marquez (1992) 1 Cal.4th 584, 603 [ 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 727 , 822 P.2d 435 ]); it is for this court to make the findings on which the resolution of [petitioner’s] habeas corpus claim will turn (In re Visciotti (1996) 14 Cal.4th 325, 349 [ 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 801 , 926 P.2d 987 ]; see In re Scott, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 824 ).” (In re Thomas (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1249, 1256-1257 [ 39 Cal.Rptr.3d 845 , 129 P.3d 49 ].)”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 41 Cal. 4th 977 - In Re Hardy