Volume 37 — Florida Reports

<p>This is a case of original jurisdiction.</p> <p>The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Holmes county.</p> <p>STATELIEST.</p> <p>The action was for fraud and deceit in the sale of lands, brought in the Circuit Court by appellee against the appellant. .The declaration-alleged “that the defendants by their agent, í)r. J. W. Chiles, did in the town of West Milton, Ohio, on the---day of May, A. X>. 1888, sell to plaintiff the following described lands, namely: the south-west quarter (S. W. ‡) section No. thirty-three (33), township live (o), north of range fourteen (14) west, containing one hundred and sixty (160) acres by government survey; said above described lands being located and situated near the town of Bonifay, in the county of Holmes, State of Florida, for which plaintiff agreed to pay the sum total of twelve hundred dollars; that subsequent to said purchase of said land of defendant, only a few days thereafter, namely, on the 18th day of May, 1SS8, he paid to the defendant’s said agent four hundred dollars cash, and gave his two certain promissory notes for four hundred dollars each, making the sum of twelve hundred dollars, the amount which he had promised to pay for said land; said notes maturing,, ■one in twelve months from date, and one in twenty-four months from date, each bearing — per cent, interest per annum. At the same time of making and delivery of said notes he made and executed a mortgage on said described land to secure the payment of. said notes subsequently to the payment of the said four hundred dollars, and the making and delivering of the said two promissory notes and mortgage. The said defendant by their said agent delivered a deed to said ■described land. That at the time and before he purchased said lands of defendants, their said agent, Ur. J. W. Chiles, represented to plaintiff that Bonifay, a town in the aforesaid county and State, was a thrifty town of several hundred people, and the county seat of Holmes county, Florida, and that this land was situated on the public highway road- leading out of said town by the court house, and only one mile, and the said land was covered with a heavy growth of black walnut, red cedar, white holly, cypress, oak, and large heavy pine timber, and the timber on said land had never been cut, but was in its virgin state, and that the timber was all valuable and that he could find ready sale in Bonifay as aforesaid for said timber, and that he could easily and readily sell the pine timber for more than enough to more than pay for one-half the defendants asked for the land; that the pine timber on said land was large and valuable, and that there was a great quantity - of it, and that he could sell this heavy pine timber alone for more than enough to pay one-half of the amount they asked for said land. That relying upon those representations made by defendant’s said agent, he was induced to purchase of defendants these said described lands, and to pay four hundred dollars cash, and to give his two certain promissory notes and mortgage aforesaid; that said land was situated a great distance from said plaintiff at the time he made said purchase, he being at the time a resident of the State of Ohio, and several hundred miles from said land, and that it would have been inconvenient and expensive for him to have given the said land a personal examination before purchasing; that all of said representations as to Bonifay being a thrifty town of several hundred people, and the county seat of Holmes county, Florida, and that said described land was situated one mile from town on a public highway road leading out of said town by the ■court house, and that the land was covered with heavy growth of black walnut, red cedar, white holly, cypress, oak and heavy pine timber, and that the timber on said land had never been cut, but was in its virgin state, and that the timber was all valuable, and he could find ready sale in Bonifay for said timber, and that he could sell the pine timber for enough to more than pay one-half the amount they asked for said land; that the pine timber on said land was large and valuable, and that there was a great quantity of it, and that he could sell this heavy pine timber alone readily for more than enough to pay one-half of the amount of price asked for said land, was untrue and basely false, and that they were known to be untrue and false at the time they were made by defendant’s said agent; that plaintiff relied on and was induced by these said representations, and that said representations were of material facts, therefore by reason’of said false and untrue representations, which induced plaintiff to purchase said land, he had been damaged in the sum of twelve hundred dollars, and brings this suit and claims of defendant the sum of twelve hundred dollars.</p> <p>To this declaration a demurrer was filed upon three grounds, viz: (1) vagueness and uncertainty, (2) failing to state a cause of action, (3) in the name of the agent, and not the principal. This demurrer being overruled, the defendant plead to the declaration, that they sold the lands mentioned in said declaration; said plaintiff desired to buy the lands for farming purposes. That these defendants did not by themselves or by their agent make the representations as to timber upon said land as set forth in said declaration. That such statements are untrue, and plaintiff was not damaged as alleged in said declaration. A demurrer to this plea was sustained, and the plaintiff filed amended pleas, that the plaintiff was not induced to buy the land "mentioned in said declaration by. representations made by the defendants about the timber growing upon said land, and that they are not guilty as alleged in plaintiff’s declaration. A demurrer to the amended plea was also sustained, and the defendant plead further, as follows: 1st. That they did sell the land as stated in plaintiff's' declaration, and that said land was worth the amount the plaintiff agreed to pay. 2nd. That the defendant did not make the representations mentioned in plaintiff’s declaration as to the land having timber growing upon it, except pine timber; that no representations were made by this defendant as to a growth of black walnut, red cedar, white holly, cypress and oak, mentioned in plaintiff’s declaration. 3d. That no representations were made that the town of Bonifay was the county seat of Holmes county at the time of making the sale of land mentioned in plaintiff’s declaration as alleged in plaintiff’s declaration. 4th. That the plaintiff long after he had executed the notes and mortgage to secure the payment of the purchase money of the land, expressed himself as well pleased, and wrote to certain papers encouraging others to come to this country; that he was highly pleased; that this was after he had taken possession of said land mentioned in plaintiff’s declaration. 5th. The defendant for further plea says the plaintiff was not induced to buy said land by reason of representations as alleged in plaintiff’s declaration, and plaintiff 'was not damaged as alleged.</p> <p>Upon this last set of pleas issue was joined, a trial had, with verdict for the plaintiff for $980; whereupon the plaintiff entered a remittitur for $56, and accepted a judgment for $928 (?) and judgment against defendant was accordingly. A motion for new trial being overruled, defendant appealed.</p> <p>Certain matters transpiring upon the trial, as shown by the bill of exceptions, are mentioned in the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval county.</p> <p>The facts in the case are stated'in the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>Writ of Error to the Circuit Court for Suwannee county.</p> <p>The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the-court.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Marion county.</p> <p>The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>Writ of error to the Circuit Court for Lake county.</p> <p>The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

Appellants instituted suit against appellees, Taylor, and fifteen others, as partners doing business as the Florida Orange Hedge Fence Company, on a note as follows: “Orlando, Fla., March 23d, 1887.

<p>1. Where one partner purchases real property with partnership assets and takes the title thereto in the name of his wife, without the consent of the other partner, a trust results to the partnership and its creditors,</p> <p>2. A transfer of partnership assets by one partner without the consent of the others, in payment of his individual debt, is a fraud upon the other partners, and does not divest the title of the partnership.</p> <p>•3. In a suit to set aside a conveyance made by a husband to his wife as fraudulent, brought by his creditors, whose claims existed at the date of such conveyance,, the burden of proving a consideration proportionate to the value of the land conveyed, is upon the wife, and clearer and fuller proof is required than if the transaction had been between strangers.</p> <p>4. A voluntary Conveyance of real property not his homestead, made by a husband to his wife when in failing circumstances, is void as to his creditors whose claims existed at the date of such conveyance.</p> <p>■5. A court of equity will entertain jurisdiction of a suit brought by a partnership creditor against the surviving partner and the administrator of a deceased partner to enforce the payment of a partnership debt out of veal property of the deceased partner, which was fraudulently conveyed by him in his lifetime to his wife, although such partnership debt had not been reduced to a judgment against such surviving partner at the commencement of such suit.</p>

STATEMENT. Massman Brothers & Co. and Gromm & Leffler filed their bill in equity against William Neubert and Edward Weil for the purpose of subjecting a certain lot and.tenements, which they alleged Weil had purchased and paid for, and caused to be fraudulently transferred to one Pauline Brown, and afterwards to Neubert, to the payment of certain judgments, which they alleged that they had recovered in the Circuit Court for Alachua ■county against Edward Weil and Solomon…

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Marion county.</p> <p>STATEMENT.</p> <p>Appellees filed a bill in chancery against Charles M. Brown, E. W. Agnew, D. J. Gillen, the Marion Phosphate Company, a corporation organized under the laws of Georgia, George J. Baldwin, the Silver Springs, Ocala & Gulf Railroad Company, a corporation organized under the laws of Florida, James H. Smith, Norman R. Smith and J. P. Pulcifer, the material allegations of which are that complainants were seized in fee of the E. % of S. E. J of sec. 26, township 16, S. of R. 18 E., situate in Marion county, the title to which being derived as follows: Yincent Botto obtained a patent from the United States government for the land in October, 1883, and thereupon took possession, and in June, 1884, conveyed the land by warranty deed to Louisa Mazza, who subsequently, and before the filing of the bill, was married to Antonio Solary. That on the 4th of March, 1888, an instrument of writing in the form of a tax deed, purporting to convey the land to William T. Tompkins, was inscribed upon the records of deeds for Marion county, a copy of the instrument being filed as a part of the bill, and on the 19th of May following Tompkins and wife, claiming an interest in the land solely by virtue of said instrument of writing, executed a formal conveyance, purporting to operate as a quit-claim deed, to Joseph B. McMurtry for an undivided half interest in said land. On the 2d of August, 1888, Tompkins and wife and Joseph B. Mc-Murtry executed a deed purporting to convey all that part of said land west and northwest of the Silver Springs, Ocala & Gulf Railroad to the defendants James H. and Norman R. Smith and J. P. Pulcifer. On the 10th of December, 1889, Tompkins and wife and Joseph B. McMurtry executed a deed purporting to convey all that part of said land east of the Silver Springs, Ocala & Gulf Railroad to defendant Charles M. Brown. Copies of the deeds from Tompkins and wife to McMurtry, Tompkins and wife and McMurtry to the Smiths and Pulcifer, and Tompkins and wife and McMurtry to Brown, are filed as exhibits to and parts of the bill of complaint.</p> <p>The tax deed to Tompkins purports to have been made upon a sale of the lands in 1887 for the non-payment of taxes assessed for the year 1886. Tire bill alleges various grounds impeaching the validity of the tax. deed, but as it is not contended here that the grounds alleged are not sufficient, if true, to avoid the deed, they are not specially mentioned.</p> <p>The bill further alleges that the defendants Brown, Agnew, Gillen, Baldwin, the Marion Phosphate Company, and the Silver Springs, Ocala & Gulf Railroad Company, combining and confederating to injure and defraud complainants, did severally, jointly and unlawfully enter upon the land, under color of the pretended tax deed and divers other .pretended claims or rights unknown to complainants, and had been and were then mining said lands for phosphate therein) and had taken and were taking phosphate from the soil thereof, of great value, the exact value of which complainants were unable to learn without an accounting under the order of the court; that phosphates were being taken in great quantities, and the lands were valuable chiefly for the presence of the phosphates therein; that said defendants had committed and were committing great and irreparable injury to the land, and were destroying the value thereof, and the trespass, injury and damage had not only been and was irreparable, but had been and was continuous in its nature, and complainants had no adequate relief except through an accounting and the process of injunction.</p> <p>The special prayers of the bill are for an injunction restraining the defendants from entering upon the land and. mining phosphate thereon; that the rights of complainants in the land be recognizéd, validated and established by decree of the court; that the tax deed he set aside and declared void; that an account be decreed of the phosphate dug and taken by defendants from the land, and of the damage done to the land by the defendants, and that they be required to pay the several amounts found to be due.</p> <p>Defendants Brown, Agnew, and the Marion Phosphate Company appeared and demurred to the bill. The grounds of the demurrer are: 1. On the face of the bill complainants were not entitled to any relief in a court of equity. 2.' The bill shows that complainants have a clear, adequate and complete remedy at law. 3. The bill is multifarious, 4. The bill is vague, indefinite, contradictory and repugnant. 5. The copy of the tax deed filed with the bill shows that such deed is void on its face, and insufficient to create a cloud upon complainants’ title. 6. There is a defect of parties in omitting to sue William T. Tompkins and J. B. McMurtry. 7. The bill fails to sufficiently allege possession of land, so as to entitle complainants to maintain the suit. 8. The bill in its introductory part fails to set forth the names and places of abode of defendants of complainants. 9. The bill is otherwise defective and insufficient. The court overruled all the grounds of the demurrer, except the fifth and eighth, which were sustained, and the order of the court on the demurrer recites that thereupon complainants, amended the bill by inserting the residences, and a clerical defect as to the copy of the tax deed was corrected, and lease given the said defendants to answer or plead by rule day in the following month.</p> <p>The said defendants filed pleas as follows: That it was not true, as alleged, that defendants or either of them were at the time of filing the bill mining said land; that it was not true that at that time phosphates-were being taken therefrom in great quantities, or that the defendants or either of them were at that time-committing great and irreparable injury to the land, or any injury whatever; that it was not true that said lands were then being injured continuously or otherwise. 2. At the time of filing the bill complainants-were in the lawful possession of the land, and that neither of the defendants was in possession of any part thereof; that neither of the defendants was then com-mitting any tresspass or injury to the land, and no-mining whatever was then being done by any person or corporation whatever, and that no phosphate was then being taken from the land, and no injury was being done to the realty or any part of it.</p> <p>Upon argument the pleas were held to be insufficient, and were overruled.</p> <p>Appeal was entered from the order overruling the first, second, third, fourth, sixth, seventh and ninth grounds of the demurrer, and also from the order overruling' the pleas.</p>

<p>Appeal from , the Circuit Court for Marion county.</p> <p>The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the-court.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Escambia county.</p> <p>The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Orange county.</p> <p>The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the-court.</p>

<p>Criminal law — prejudicial questions on voir dire — oral CHARGES—IGNORING DOCTRINE OF REASONABLE DOUBT IN CHARGE.</p> <p>1. On the examination of the jurors on their voir dire the judge, expressly naming each one of the prisoners counsel asked of each juror if said counsel or any one had talked with him about the case, or spoken to, or had any conversation of any kind whatever with him relative to the case: Held, That the question tended to prejudice the defendants’ case from the pointedness of its aim at their defending counsel: that if such questions became necessary, they should be more generally framed, with less pointedness at any particular counsel in the case. That the utmost care should always be used by trial judges, especially in capital cases, not to let any expression fall, either by questions or otherwise, that is capable of being interpreted by the jury as an index of what he thinks of the prisoner, his counsel or his case.</p> <p>2. The provisions of section 2920 of the Revised Statutes are mandatory, and positively require that the charge of the court in capital cases shall be wholly in writing; and if, in such a case, any portion of the charge is given orally, and exception thereto is properly and seasonably taken, it is ground for reversal, as such provisions of law are required to be complied Vvith strictly. If the manner of giving the charge is not excepted to promptly at the time it is given orally, it will be considered as waived, and is not ground of reversal.</p> <p>3. It is error to instruct the jury in a murder trial, that before a defendant can be justified in taking the life of his assailant he must satisfy the jury that the defense was necessary at the time, that he did all he could to avoid it, and that it ivas necessary to protect his own life, etc. The established rule of law is, that if the evidence upon this or any other material question in the case goes far enough to raise a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jury, it is sufficient for acquittal, whether the jury are satisfied upon the point or not.</p>

<p>Writ of error t§ the Circuit Court for DeSoto county.</p> <p>The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the «court.</p>

STATEMENT. The appellant, as administrator of the estate of John Loomis, deceased, filed a bill in equity against the appellee, a corporation existing under the laws of Florida, for the purpose of foreclosing a mortgage on real estate executed by the corporation to said decedent as-.trustee The mortgage, dated the first day of July, 1889, recites that Loomis, the party of the second part, was trustee for the corporation in the issuance by it of a series of sixty bonds of…

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Escambia •county.</p> <p>The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the •court.</p>

<p>STATE INSOLVENT LAWS — CHARGE ERRONEOUS ONLY IN PARTY’S PAVOR.</p> <p>1. The several States of the American Union have power to enact insolvent or bankruptcy laws, applicable within their respective territories, so long as the Congress of the United States abstains from exercising its exclusive power to provide a general bankruptcy law.</p> <p>2. State insolvent laws are effective to discharge the debtor from all debts contracted subsequent to the enactment of the law and that are due to citizens of the State under whose law the discharge is claimed.</p> <p>3. State insolvent laws can not and do not affect debts due .to non-resident creditors, unless such creditor voluntarily makes himself a party to the insolvent proceedings instituted under such State law.</p> <p>4. By proving his debt and presenting it ‡0 the assignee in the insolvent proceedings and accepting a dividend thereunder, the non-resident creditor subjects his claim to the jurisdiction of the State insolvent law, and is bound by the debtor’s discharge thereunder, so that his debt is barred thereby.</p> <p>5. Where the only error in a charge consists in its statement of a proposition entirely in favor of the party questioning it, it is, as to him, harmless -error.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval county.</p> <p>The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the court..</p>

<p>EQUITY PRACTICE—IGNORING' INFORMAL PLEADING—REFERENCE TOmaster—who to make order of.</p> <p>1. When the defendant to a bill for foreclosure of mortgage interposes a plea to such bill, but fails] to verify it by oath, and fails to have it certified by his counsel as being, in his opinion, well-founded in law, the complainant has a right to ignore such a plea, and to treat it as no plea at all, and to enter decree pro oonfesso for want of any pleading.</p> <p>2. The order of reference to a master to take testimony in a chancery cause should be made by the judge, and not by counsel in the cause.</p> <p>3. After a decree pro oonfesso is properly entered in a foreclosure •suit, where there is no complicated accounting to be had, the judge can hear such evidence, ex parte the complainant, as is necessary to determine the reasonableness of attorneys’ fees contracted by the mortgage to be paid in the event of its foreclosure, and as to the amount paid out by the complainant for taxes and to keep the property in repair, and can himself compute the amount due for principal and interest on the mortgage, and thereupon render a final decree, without any reference of such matters to a master to take such evidence.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Orange county.</p> <p>The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>Since the Revised Statutes became operative (June 13, 1892) a review in the Appellate Court of all proceedings of a lower court in cases at law is by writ of error, except in certain enumerated cases ; and an attempted appeal entered in an ordinary action at law since the date mentioned will be dismissed.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Escambia county.</p> <p>The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Escambia county.</p> <p>The facts in the case aré stated in the opinion of the •court.</p>

<p>Writ of Error to the Circuit Court for Bradford comity.</p> <p>Motions to dismiss the writ of error and to vacate the supersedeas.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon county.</p> <p>The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>Writ of error to the Circuit Court for Putnam county.</p> <p>The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the' court.</p>

Writ of Error to the Criminal Court of Record for Duval eounty. The facts in the case are'stated in the opinion of the court.

<p>An information under our statute (section 2419 Revised Statutes) prescribing a penalty against “whoever speaks of and concerning any woman, married or unmarried, falsely and maliciously, imputing to her a want of chastity,” should not only set out the words constituting the oral slander, but should also charge that they were uttered or spoken in .the presence of some one; and the better practice would be to set out the names, or some of them of the persons before whom they were uttered or spoken.</p>

<p>Writ of Error to tlie Circuit Court for Lee county.</p> <p>The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the Court.</p>

<p>1. It is the rule of this court, established by previous decisions, that there must be a scire facias, or citation, returnable with the writ of error, or appeal, and service of the scire facias, or citation, within the time prescribed by statute before the return ' day of the cause; otherwise the writ of error, or appeal, fails and will be dismissed.</p> <p>2. The appeal in this case dismissed upon • showing that it was entered more than thirty days before the January term, 1896, of this court, and the citation was not issued until the 11th day of January of this year—only three days before the return day of the cause—and was made returnable to the 25th day of February following.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval county.</p> <p>The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for St. Johns ■county.</p> <p>The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the •court.</p> <p>Motion to dismiss Appeal.</p>

Writ of Error to tlie Circuit Court for Bradford county. The facts iu the case are stated in the opinion of the court. Motion to dismiss Writ of Error.

STATEMENT. ' David A. Felt being indebted to Charlotte Sauls in the sum of five hundred dollars, evidenced by promissory note bearing date March 5th, 1880, executed, in conjunction with his wife, Sarah Felt, a mortgage on a described lot of land in Volusia county to secure the payment of the note.

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Bradford county.</p> <p>The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the court.</p> <p>Motion to dismiss appeal.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hillsborough county.</p> <p>The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>Writ of Error to the Circuit Court for Gadsden-county.</p> <p>The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Suwannee county.</p> <p>The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>Writ of error to the Circuit Court for Walton county.</p> <p>The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the-court.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Alachua county.</p> <p>The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

STATEMENT. The appellant, as complainant in the Circuit Court, filed his bill of complaint against the appellees, as defendants. For convenience the respective parties are 'hereinafter called, as in the court below, the complainant and the defendants.

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval county.</p> <p>The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

STATEMENT. The appellant, complainant below, brought his bill of complaint in the Circuit Court against appellees.' The bill sought to enforce specific performance of a written agreement for the sale of a tract of fifteen acres of land therein described, to enjoin a pending action of ejectment for said land brought by the appellee, the Pensacola, Gulf, Land and Development Company against the complainant.

STATEMENT. Prances A. Ransom, as administratrix of Theodore M. Ransom, deceased? brought an action of ejectment in the Circuit Court against James T. Sanders and John ÍT. Waller for a tract of land in Brevard county. Afterwards C. T. McCarty, Arthur E. Saeger and George A. Saeger were upon their own application made'parties defendant.

<p>Writ of error to the Circuit Court for Hillsborough! county.</p> <p>The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>1. Under special circumstances permission may be given at the final' - hearing of a chancery case to supply defects in testimony, and the cause ordered to stand over for that purpose. This permission is cautiously granted after publication of the testimony has passed, and is generally confined to proofs by documentary evidence, or the execution of deeds and papers, where the dangers attending such proofs are not so great.</p> <p>3. Where a bill is dismissed without a consideration of the merits, it is the usual practice for the decree to state that the dismissal, is without prejudice.</p> <p>3. The refusal of the chancellor to order a cause to stand over to-supply proof of the existence and execution of deeds required' to be proven under the pleading will not be reversed when no excuse is offered for the failure to make such proof within the-time allowed for such purpose.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Marion county.</p> <p>The facts in the case are stated in,the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>1. The second paragraph of section 1088, Revised Statutes, has not' curtailed the province of the jury in passing upon the facts of a case, nor has it enlarged the powers of the court as to its determination of the facts.</p> <p>%. The rule established by the statute is that if no evidence is introduced upon which a jury may lawfully find a verdict for one party, a direction may be given to find for the opposite party, but the judge should never' 'direct a verdict for one party, unless the evidence is such that no view which the jury may lawfully take of it favorable to the other party can be sustained.</p> <p>3. In all cases where there is room for difference of opinion between reasonable men as to the existence of facts from which an ultimate fact is sought to be established, or when there is room for such difference as to the inferences which might be drawn from conceded facts, the court should submit the case to the jury for their finding, as it is their conclusion, in such cases, that should prevail, and not the views of the judge.</p> <p>4 The duty devolving upon the court in reference tc directing a verdict on the evidence may become, in many cases, one of delicacy, and should be cautiously exercised.</p> <p>5. A wide latitude is permitted in the proof of fraud, and testimony tending to show that a debtor, in failing circumstances, immediately before a sale of his entire property, stated to other parties than the purchaser that he wanted money, and they could have his property at their own price, is admissable as bearing upon a fraudulent purpose in the disposition of the property.</p>

<p>Appeal from tlie Circuit Court for .Jackson county.</p> <p>■ ■ The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

Court for Citrus county. STATEMENT. The appellant, who was complainant below, and if hereinafter called the complainant, on April l”0th', 1889, brought his bill in chancery against the appellees, defendants below, hereinafter called the defendants. The bill sought to subject a forty-acre tract of and therein described to the payment of a judgment obtained by complainant against the defendant J. Wesley Allen.

statement. A bill was filed by appellee to enjoin appellant, collector of revenue of Duval county, from seizing a steamboat for taxes claimed to be due the State and county. Tire substantial allegations of tlie bill set out in paragraph, are as follows: 1.

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Yolusia county.</p> <p>The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the court.</p>

<p>Motion to dismiss ayjpeals and to vacate supersedeas orders.</p>

STATEMENT. Suit by appellant against 'appellees on bond. On the 25th of October, A. D. 1890, appellant and McClatchy entered into an agreement whereby the latter covenanted and agreed, for the consideration thereinafter expressed, to erect, finish and deliver, on or before the first day of January, 1891, in true thorough artisan, perfect and substantial manner, certain build-lugs according to plans and specifications attached and made part of the agreement.

Writ of Error to the Circuit Court for Alachua county. The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the-court. Motion to dismiss Writ of Error.

Writ of Error to the Circuit Court for Alachua county. Motion to Reinstate Writ of Error. The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the court.

<p>This is a case of original jurisdiction.</p> <p>- The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the-court.</p>

<p>1. A presumption against the correctness of the judgment should* not be indulged, in the absence of existing record evidence-that may overcome such presumption.</p> <p>2. The certificate of the clerk to a transcript of the record that it contains all the proceedings material to the appeal, when it is-apparent that there were other proceedings, can not control,, as the record alone must speak.</p> <p>3. In the absence of the issues upon which a case was tried, and any showing as to what the testimony tended to develop thereunder, the appellate court can not know that appellant was-harmed by the rendition of a judgment against him.</p>

<p>This is a case of original jurisdiction.</p> <p>The facts in the case are stated in the opinion of the-court.</p>

STATEMENT. The original bill filed in this case was by the Tampa Waterworks Company against George W. Cline, Sr., and George W. Cline, Jr., and subsequently an amended bill was filed against George W. Cline, Sr.—the junior-having died in the meantime.

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court for Alachua county.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>